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Abstract
In this paper I argue for the value of literature in ethical instruction. Following
Martha Nussbaum, I argue that literature often promotes the kind of context-specific
judgment, respect for the cognitive value of the emotions and empathy for others that are
foundational to the kind of ethical judgment Nussbaum and I support. Like Nussbaum, I
find that Henry James’s novels evince these same ethical values and that his novels,
especially the novels of the late phase, are therefore useful for ethical instruction. Unlike
Nussbaum, however, I do not believe that James portrays erotic love as an emotion that is
incompatible with ethical judgment. Instead I believe that James makes a distinction
between desire and love and that the former is incompatible with ethical judgment but the
latter is not. In fact, I argue that James portrays erotic love as a stimulus to the kind of
openness to the other that is necessary for accurate judgment, and I demonstrate this by
examining the main characters of three novels of the experimental phase—The Spoils of
Poynton, What Maisie Knew, and The Awkward Age—and exposing the ways in which
their love for others, especially their erotic love for others, encourages (or could have
encouraged, in cases where the characters fail to love) their capacity for ethical judgment.
By focusing on three novels from the experimental period I also expose the connections
between the thematic concerns of the experimental and late periods and suggest that
James is as preoccupied in his middle period as is in his late period with the relationship
between awareness of others and an appreciation and affection for them.
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Chapter I
In a 1999 article in PMLA Lawrence Buell highlights six major strands of thought
influencing the current revival of ethical criticism in literary studies. The first is an
approach interested in the “moral thematics and underlying value commitments of
literary texts and their implied value,” an approach Buell sees as a modernized version of
the “Arnoldian-Leavisite conception of literature as ethical reflection.”1 A second is “the
intellectual history of moral thought from Puritanism to transcendentalism to
pragmaticism and beyond,” and a third the interest in the ethics of narrative and genre
typified in the work of Wayne Booth, as well as more recently in works like Adam
Newton’s Narrative Ethics (8). This latter approach emphasizes the ethical implications
of a text’s (or as Booth calls it, an “implied author’s) rhetorical commitments. A fourth
strand is the growing interest among some ethical philosophers in the moral value of
literature; works by Martha Nussbaum in particular have “mattered to scholars in the
field of literature less because of any radical originality of method than insofar as their
example has abetted revival of a moral or social value-oriented approach to literary
studies” (8). The fifth and sixth strands, those Buell believes to have had the strongest
influence on the ethical redirection of literary studies, are the turn towards ethical issues
evinced in the late works of Derrida and Foucault. Buell pinpoints the 1987 posthumous
publication of “Nazi-collaborationist” passages from Paul de Man’s journal as an impetus
for the reevaluation of the esoteric interests of deconstruction and Derrida’s own turn
towards social and ethical issues in works like The Gift of Death (9). He also points out
that in the History of Sexuality Foucault “shifted from his longstanding concentration on
the power-knowledge problematic and on the construction of social selves by discursive
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macroinstitutions to the care of the self conceived as an ethical project” (9-10).
My own approach in this paper has been influenced more by the third and fourth
strands of thought than by the ethical turn within deconstruction; in fact, my impatience
with (among other faults) the esotericism of the “early” Derrida motivated my delight in
discovering the neohumanist current in ethical criticism. Another motivation was my
impatience with the reductive nature of most political theory, which seemed equally
ineffectual as politics and as tools for comprehensive literary analysis. In contrast,
Wayne Booth’s seminal work The Company We Keep defines the ethical broadly enough
to include qualities we would normally call aesthetic while never allowing us to forget
that these aesthetic qualities matter to our daily lives. Building on the analogy that books
are like friends, Booth suggests that the books that are the most ethically valuable in this
broader sense of the ethical—the ones that offer us the most enrichment—are the ones
with which we should spend the most time.
The texts I want to examine, several works by Henry James, exhibit the kind of
balance between quantity and concision, reciprocity and hierarchy, intimacy and reserve,
etc. that according to Booth characterize the best of friends.2 (In the past Booth has
expressed reservations about other of James’s works and I will mention these later.)
James has in fact been a favorite source for both philosophers and literary critics engaged
in the recent revitalization of ethical criticism, and the list of those who have written on
Jamesian morality includes among others Martha Nussbaum, Cora Diamond, and J. Hillis
Miller.3 James’s popularity can be attributed in large part to his inclusive moral outlook,
an outlook formed partly in response to the waning authority of prescriptive morality and
traditional social hierarchies in the face of the cultural and economic upheavals of the
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries. James is uneasy about the vulgar materialism he sees
filling the gap caused by these eroding traditions, yet like his brother William envisions
the possibility that the gap might also clear the way to an ethical view that is responsive
to the contingencies of experience and depends more on the cultivation of personal
character than on rules and absolutes. In her article “Exactly and Responsibly: A
Defense of Ethical Criticism” Nussbaum summarizes the salient characteristics of this
ethical view, described in James’s theoretical writings as well as in his novels, as:
(1) an insistence on the plurality and non-commensurability of
the valuable elements of a well-lived life; (2) an insistence on the
importance of contextual complexity and particularized judgment in good
deliberation; (3) an insistence on the cognitive role of the emotions; and
(4) an insistence on human vulnerability and the vulnerability of the
good.4
This description of James’s ethical view undergirds my own paper; and in fact most of
what follows could be described as a corrective footnote to Nussbaum’s work on James
in Love’s Knowledge. My correction is primarily aimed at Nussbaum’s belief that James
portrays erotic love as incompatible with the clarity of vision and judgment necessary to
sustain this ethical view. I believe on the contrary James makes a distinction between
desire and erotic love—a distinction that may not be clear to Nussbaum, whose idea of
eros derives from Aristotle—and though the former is incompatible with his ethical view,
the latter is not. In fact, I believe that James’s texts portray erotic (or romantic) love as
well as other forms of love as both enhanced by and even enhancing the susceptibility to
the particular indispensable to this kind of ethical outlook.
In his book Desire and Love in Henry James David McWhirter argues that
James’s fiction makes a distinction between desire and love.5 Desire is a “narcissistic
fantasizing of the mind”; a person consumed with desire is interested in the other only as
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a projection of his or her own needs and lusts (5). A loving person, on the other hand,
“embraces the other’s limited and imperfect reality, and invites and accepts the binding
and defining embrace offered by the other” (6). I agree with this analysis, which would
demote what Nussbaum calls erotic love to mere desire and preserve erotic love from
being banished from the ethical existence. But I do not agree with McWhirter’s
application of this analysis to the three major novels of James’s late phase, The
Ambassadors, The Wings of the Dove, and The Golden Bowl. McWhirter claims that
these novels show a progression from an uncritical endorsement of desire as embodied in
Lambert Strether to a rejection of desire and an affirmation of love, typified in the
mutually affirming embrace of Maggie and the Prince at the end of The Golden Bowl.
My own interpretation of these novels is that if they show any movement at all it is
towards a greater degree of fatalism about the possibility of achieving a real awareness of
and commitment to the other in the face of “the constant force that makes for
muddlement.”6 Maggie’s emotion for the Prince, for example, never matures beyond a
selfish desire for possession, and her “pity and dread” in the last line of the novel testify
to her dim awareness of this fact.
The late novels have garnered so much theoretical attention over the last several
decades that instead of providing full-blown alternatives to these readings I would like to
examine three novels from the experimental period that can more justifiably be said to
progress from ambivalent portrayals of desire to moving portrayals of genuine love of
both the romantic and platonic varieties. These novels have added benefit of portraying
very similar heroines in very similar situations. The form and content of each establishes
a connection between love and a particular kind of ethical sensitivity. In demonstrating
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this connection I also hope to prove that James intended his novels to serve a larger
purpose, one that is important to most people who embark on ethical criticism, and that is
to help readers proceed from and through textual analysis to self-analysis. Most disciples
of the various jargon-laden political theories currently dominating graduate seminars and
literary journals seem intent on proving that the political is not personal, and I think that
if literature is going to retain any sort of relevancy in the twenty-first century for both
students and the wider culture we who still treasure and teach it are going to have to keep
reminding ourselves that literature is first of all—always—for life.

Endnotes
1

Lawrence Buell, “In Pursuit of Ethics,” PMLA 114.1 (January 1999): 7-19.
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For a complete list of Booth’s criteria for judging books’ ethical value, see chapter six
of The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988).
3

See Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (1990) and Poetic Justice (1995); Cora Diamond,
The Realistic Spirit (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1991), and J. Hillis
Miller, The Ethics of Reading (New York: Columbia UP, 1987).
4

Martha Nussbaum, “Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism,”
Philosophy and Literature 22.2 (1998): 348.
5

David McWhirter, Desire and Love in Henry James (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989).
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Henry James, “Preface,” What Maisie Knew, In the Cage, The Pupil, (New York:
Charles Scribner’s sons, 1908): 15.
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Chapter II
In the introduction to Love’s Knowledge Nussbaum describes her evolving
attitude towards the place of erotic love in the ethical life. In her initial approach to the
subject she was convinced that the Aristotelian ethical stance, a stance characterized by
the context-specific judgment described above, “was inclusive enough to encompass
every constituent of the good human life, love included” (50). She saw this attitude
reflected in James’s novels, in his belief that a rich awareness should and could infuse
every aspect of an individual’s life, including his love life (51). Later, however, she
came to believe that erotic love could conflict with the ethical viewpoint, “even when that
viewpoint is understood in the broad Jamesian/Aristotelian way” (51). She read The
Golden Bowl and The Ambassadors to be dramatizing that conflict, to be showing that,
for example, the ethical consciousness Maggie develops throughout the second half of
The Golden Bowl has to be sacrificed to her love for the Prince, a sacrifice symbolized by
her burying her eyes in his breast at the novel’s end (136-7). Likewise, Nussbaum
suggests that Strether’s failure to love Maria Gostrey and approve Chad and Madame de
Vionnet’s relationship results from his disapproval of any action that requires an
individual to sacrifice his clear-sightedness (his ability to see everything) and his
rationality (his ability to explain what he sees in a way that makes it clear to others).
Nussbaum eventually arrived at a third view, one she sees illustrated in David
Copperfield, in David’s erotic love for Steerforth but rarely in James. Nussbaum believes
that David’s love for Steerforth is a function of his ability to see clearly, to enter into the
experiences of others. Unlike Strether, David uses his capacity for perception to close
distance between himself and others, not to create it, implying that “the non-judgmental
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love of particulars characteristic of the best and must humane ethical stance contains
within itself a susceptibility to love, and to a love that leads the lover at times beyond the
ethical stance into a world in which ethical judgment does not take place” (52). For
David storytelling becomes an expression of this loving perception, a way to
acknowledge the claims of both Steerforth (who represents the erotic) and Agnes (who
represents morality). David believes that art mediates between these two perspectives,
that the best art promotes perceptive love, not perceptive distance, and inspires warmth as
well as reflection. James’s narrators, on the other hand, are determined to maintain their
reflective distance, which is why love—Nussbaum claims—is always relegated to the
margins of the Jamesian novel (346). James refuses to allow us to participate in anything
that dulls his characters’ capacity for reflection and may dull ours: “we are borne up
morally, held as ‘participators by a fond attention’ in the adventures of all the characters,
even when we are reminded that there are silences into which the morality of fine-tuned
social perception has no entry” (346). According to Nussbaum, James believes that the
novel should function as friend and guide, not as lover and seducer, and he is wary of
attempts to mediate between the two roles, whether by his characters or his readers.
Although I agree with Nussbaum that James certainly intends his novels to
encourage his readers’ capacity for reflection, I do not believe that he intends to suggest
that reflection alone is the ultimate end of the ethical life. Instead I believe James’s
novels frequently point to the truth that “the non-judgmental love of particulars
characteristic of the best and most humane ethical stance contains within itself a
susceptibility to love,” and that cultivating this susceptibility is part of the goal. Over and
over again in his novels James shows characters whose capacity for perception nourishes
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their capacity for love, characters who, if they fail to actualize their love, fail either
because they have made reflection itself an absolute goal or (more frequently) because
they have reverted to a more primitive pre-reflective moral standard—but not because
love categorically resists reflective consciousness. Nussbaum’s reading of James is not
thorough enough; where she sees characters whose reflective consciousness conflicts
with love, I see characters whose conflict with love results from their inability to sustain
this consciousness, either because they are “too old,” too immature, too idealistic or too
afraid to abandon their prejudices entirely. Nussbaum also makes the mistake of
assuming that the emotion that causes Maggie to bury her eyes in the Prince’s breast—or
the emotion that Strether sees between Chad and Madame de Vionnet, especially when he
spies them on the river—is the only kind of love there is, or that it is love at all, instead of
lust or, as Pippin argues in Maggie’s case, the same kind of desire that leads Adam
Verver to collect works of art.1 James is wary of any emotion that resists reflection, and
erotic love is an emotion that often does and one he is notoriously wary of, but he would
not agree that a resistance to reflection is one of its definitive characteristics. Instead, he
would say that reflection enriches and justifies erotic love, just as it enriches charitable
love and friendship. The result of that reflection does not, however, “lead the lover at
times beyond the ethical stance and into a world in which ethical judgment does not take
place,” if by “ethical stance” Nussbaum means to include both “ethical judgment” and
“the non-judgmental love of particulars” (52). In her explication of the novels she at
times confounds the two. As the novels and prefaces show, James would say that
judgment understood as “the non-judgmental love of particulars” is integral to the
ultimate success of every type of love, and that even judgment understood in a more
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traditional sense may have a place, though it is would not be the place a traditional
moralist would give it.
If it has one it will be contained within James’s larger sense of judgment, this
keen sensitivity to the particular. James’s judgment is more inclusive than the traditional
moralists’; an individual’s aesthetic value—his picturesqueness, so to speak—qualifies
him for moral appreciation even if from the traditional moralist’s point of view nothing
does. The imagination James and his narrators possess helps them discover some
redemptive quality in everyone, even if it is only in a character’s aesthetic or dramatic
value for the author or perceiver. Thoroughly evil characters are infrequent in James’s
novels, as infrequent as his most perceptive narrators’ attempts to make reductive
judgments like “good,” “bad,” “right” or “wrong.”

In fact, judgment is probably the

wrong word for the type of reflection of which James approves; it could more be
accurately called perception, if we understand perception not as a precognitive activity
but as a conscious and constant attempt to distinguish between views that are clouded by
unexamined emotions or ideas and views that (as far as this is possible) attempt to do
justice to every possible perspective on given people and situations. James himself called
it imagination. As Cora Diamond writes, James’s morality consists precisely in his
reluctance to judge, if we understand judgment in the traditional sense.2 Morality for
James consists in cultivating one’s capacity for perception, even if that perception leads
one to see beauties or interest in people more traditional moralists would condemn. What
saves this from being mere decadent aestheticism, after the manner, say, of Kierkegaard’s
seducer, is the sense of responsibility inherent in James’s notion of perception: one has a
responsibility to “be one of the people on whom nothing is lost, ” which includes seeing
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that life matters for more than spectacle to most human beings.3 To attempt to make
reflection an end in itself—to cultivate it with a decadent detachment as Mrs. Brooks
attempts to do in The Awkward Age—is as much a fault as not cultivating it at all. For
everyone who is recognizably human this attempt at detachment will always fail anyway,
as it does for Mrs. Brooks. Kierkegaard’s seducer has more in common with a devil than
a man, his existence more with death than life, which is precisely Kierkegaard’s point.
As we shall see, characters in James who attempt to detach reflection from life—an
attempt usually motivated by a desire to make life like work of art, whether that be a
golden bowl, a French painting, a house full of priceless antiques or a literary salon—
either fail, because life messily intrudes and reminds them of the impossibility of
avoiding responsibility, or succeed only by blinding themselves, by shutting their eyes to
life and growth and choosing an unmistakably sterile existence, a kind of death-in-life.
We can see that the responsible reflection James promotes in his narrators, as well
as in himself, is for him the only existential option that avoids the life-denying extremes
of a Mrs. Brooks, whose artistic code is ultimately no less short-sighted than Mrs.
Newsome’s moral code. We can also see how reflection is so closely connected to love.
For James perception is not real if it is not responsible to life and to others. In fact,
responsibility is always already in such perception for James; to perceive things is
already to have become responsible for them, to have taken action on their behalf, and to
refuse to acknowledge that this is so is a dangerous position to be in, for oneself as well
as for others. To perceive is already to have performed an act of altruism. To capitalize
on this with further acts of altruism, acts that resemble more closely our usual perception
of “acts,” is a difficult task, since “really experience ends nowhere” and deciding on
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which perception to act can seem arbitrary and acting at all inopportune. There is always
a sense in which acting on one perception may jeopardize our responsibility to the next
one. Here is where many of James’s narrators back down or break down, and
understandably so; what I want to suggest is that here is also where the texts offer the
possibility of not breaking down, of overcoming this difficulty by committing to love, by
willing or encouraging love to inspire continued action, action that even if arbitrary or
inopportune will be forgiven or forgivable because motivated by love. Perception is a
reaching out to the other, an initiatory act of altruism, and as such is difficult to sustain,
much less to expand upon; James knows, however, that love frequently inspires
perceptiveness and other acts of altruism in people whose perceptive powers in general
are underdeveloped. Consequently he is sensitive to the ways in which love—genuine
love, whether of the erosic or agapic variety—can help bridge the gap between reflection
and stronger acts of altruism. He also realizes, on the other hand, that cultivating
perception can help actualize and nourish love.
Examining the connections between love and reflection in James’s novels is my
goal in working through them. As Nussbaum points out, these connections are rarely
spelled out for us. Characters seldom achieve a perfect synthesis between perception and
love; Nussbaum mentions the love between Hyacinth Robinson and Millicent Henning,
Hyacinth and Lady Aurora’s “merciful love” for the Princess and the love between the
Assinghams in The Golden Bowl as rare exceptions.4 More often, the possibility is
revealed in the missed opportunities, when readers start asking themselves, “What went
wrong here?” or “What has the protagonist done or not done?” James’s texts are
designed to encourage these questions, to make readers provide whatever answers might
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be had. The preoccupation with reflection that Nussbaum complains of—as well as the
ambiguity that Booth once notoriously decried—are techniques deliberately adopted to
encourage moral reflection in the readers, to encourage them to provide the answers that
novelists like Dickens provide for their readers.5 Unlike Dickens’s readers, James’s
readers are seldom allowed to feel the complacency of having the morals worked out for
them in advance, of having everything tied together in a way that leaves them with
nothing but satisfaction. Such satisfaction can all too easily turn into self-satisfaction and
moral inertia if readers begin to assume that in assenting to David’s love for Steerforth,
for example, they have performed an action as great as David’s own. James is aware of
this danger, and his moral earnestness can only be said to be that much greater if he
denies his readers the possibility of confusing assent with more active forms of
altruism—if he hopes that letting readers work the problems out for themselves will push
them further along the road towards ethical living. Perhaps in his early years Booth was
unable to acknowledge the moral motivation behind James’s ambiguity because of his
formalist commitments to closure, although even in The Company We Keep, published
almost thirty years after Rhetoric, Booth suggests that “total openness would be total
entropy—and hence total apathy in the reader” and uses The Turn of the Screw as his
example of an overly open text (64). I would agree that texts like The Turn of the Screw
and—even more so—The Sacred Fount may put a burden on the reader that proves
counterproductive to attempts to extract anything, unless the moral is (as many have
argued) that danger and bewilderment occur whenever perception is divorced from
reality.6 James’s ambiguity has been less of a problem for postmodern critics, though
often they seem to have wanted to exploit it without asking whether or not it is an end in
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itself. On the other hand, Nussbaum’s failure to question reflection as an end in itself
seems to be less about a prior agenda than about inattention to the function of reflexivity
in literary works—the moral of which may be that knowledge of narrative technique is
never moot, even for philosophical uses of literature. In looking at the novels, then,
focusing on The Spoils of Poynton and two other novels from James’s experimental
period before surveying The Ambassadors and The Golden Bowl, we will need to be
sensitive to their literary characteristics. Often I will be employing Booth’s technique of
juxtaposing what is said—usually from a limited third-person point of view—with what
is not said, asking if the gap between the two might be caused by the narrator’s lack of
perception, lack of love, or both, and what this may reveal about perception, love, and the
relationship between the two. In the three experimental novels we will find that as we
move through them chronologically this gap lessens, as James begins to portray
protagonists whose capacity for perception and self-discloser is strengthened by their
capacity for love.
Endnotes
1

Robert B. Pippin, Henry James and Modern Moral Life, (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
2000): 78.
2

Cora Diamond, “Henry James, Moral Philosophers, Moralism,” Mapping the Ethical
Turn, ed. Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack (Charlottesville: University Press of
Virginia, 2001) 252.
3

Henry James, “The Art of Fiction.” The Art of Criticism: Henry James on the Theory
and Practice of Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).
4

Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990): 53.

5

Ibid. p. 53, and Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, (Chicago, The University of
Chicago Press, 1961).

13

6

For a summary of some of these judgments of The Sacred Fount, see the chapter on
James’ experimental period in Daniel Fogel, A Companion to Henry James’ Studies
(Greenwood Press, 1993).
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Chapter III
The first of these novels, The Spoils Of Poynton, is written almost exclusively
from the perspective of Fleda Vetch, a portionless young woman introduced to us by Mrs.
Gereth, who is a widow anticipating being deprived of her home by her son’s marriage.
As Fleda will later remark, Mrs. Gereth has “no imagination about anybody’s life save on
the side she bumps against…no perception of anybody’s character—[has] only one
question about persons: [are] they clever or stupid?”1 To be clever in Mrs. Gereth’s
sense means “to know the ‘marks,’” which means to be able to recognize and appreciate
good taste—to have a “passion for the exquisite” (6). Fleda knows the marks by “direct
inspiration, and a warm recognition of this is [Mrs. Gereth’s] tribute to her character”
(138). Mrs. Gereth notices that Fleda is the one member of the Waterbath party who is as
horrified as she by the vulgarity of their surroundings, someone who may be able to
marry her son and preserve the beauty and integrity of Poynton. Since this is the only
aspect of anyone’s character that Mrs. Gereth is able to recognize, once she has her utility
as a narrator is over. On the other hand, Fleda is extremely imaginative. Dragged into
the drama by Mrs. Gereth, she becomes an illustration of James preference for “the
particular attaching case plus some near individual view of it; that nearness [he adds]
quite having thus to become an imagined observer’s, a projected, charmed painter’s or
poet’s—however avowed the ‘minor’ quality in the latter—close and sensitive contact
with it.” 2 As he says later in the same preface, Fleda is both “highly individualized” and
“highly intelligent,” and in the preface to Spoils he claims that she “demonically both
sees and feels, while the others but feel without seeing.”3
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The question of how thoroughly Fleda sees and feels has been a preoccupation of
the novel’s critics. Some have sided with James’s own evaluation in the preface of
Spoils, where he wrote that Fleda is “a free spirit, always much tormented, and by no
means always triumphant…[but] ‘sucessful’ only through having remained free,” while
others have insisted that she is bound to a “rigid code of ethics.”4 James’s preface
appears to ask us to trust Fleda’s version of the events, to believe that in refusing to help
Mrs. Gereth’s son Owen break his engagement with Mona she has preserved the source
of her freedom—her clarity of vision and judgment—against the onslaught of her own
mindless passion and others’ desire to possess her. In asking ourselves whether James’s
evaluation of his own work is accurate (if we assume that he is unequivocally endorsing
Fleda) the question that first presents itself is why, if Fleda is in the right, she succumbs
to Mrs. Gereth accusations at the novel’s climax and writes a telegram calling Owen
back. Is this merely an instance of the tendency of a person of unique susceptibility to be
temporarily overwhelmed by strong monomaniacal natures, or perhaps a guilty and
compassionate attempt to placate Mrs. Gereth by an empty gesture, one she already
knows to be futile? The text supports both responses, but neither excludes the possibility
of a third, the possibility that Fleda recognizes the truth in what Mrs. Gereth says—
recognizes a version of the scene that she has been unable to acknowledge to herself—
and feels suddenly empowered to action by having it brought into the open by someone
else. Mrs. Gereth’s version, which makes Freda’s cheek “sting from a slap,” is that
insisting that Owen let Mona decide whether or not to break the engagement is an act of
“systematic…idiotic perversity”:
‘What are you, after all, my dear, I should like to know, that a gentleman
who offers you what Owen offers should have to meet such wonderful
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exactions, to take such ordinary precautions about your sweet little
scruples?’ [Mrs. Gereth’s] resentment rose to a high insolence which
Fleda took full in the face and which, for the moment at least, had the
horrible force to present to her vengefully a showy side of the truth. It
gave her a blinding glimpse of lost alternatives (220).
The awareness is momentary, and by the end of the novel—or at least until the house
burns down—Fleda is again reconciled to her decision and “happy,” and even attempts to
persuade Mrs. Gereth that the refuge of the unhappy maiden aunt to which Mrs. Gereth
has fled has a charm, a “soul, a story, [and] a life,” that Poynton lacked (251). But the
brevity of the recognition does not negate the recognition itself. It is only one side—a
“showy side,” the showiness of which, for a girl who hates ostentation and vulgarity, may
hint at why she missed or suppressed it—but it is a side of the truth, though it may be the
only side Mrs. Gereth is capable of recognizing and the only one Fleda is not. The force
of the recognition reverberates in Fleda’s reaction, the boldest action she takes
throughout the course of the novel: Mrs. Gereth’s description of the lost alternatives stirs
Fleda like “the shake of a tambourine borne toward her from a gypsy dance: her head
seemed to go round and she felt a sudden passion in her feet…she heard herself presently
say, ‘I’ll go to the Registrar now’” (220).
She is too late, of course, but the next question (though Fleda herself ignores it) is
how a girl who has shown herself so perceptive in general has managed to miss any part
of the truth, much less a part that has as much bearing on her own future as it does on the
future of those around her. An omniscient narrator warns us in chapter one that Fleda
“has even from herself wonderful secrets of delicacy and pride,” speaking gently of her
“little life” and “meagre past” (10). Her pride and her meager past are readers’ clues to
her lapse in perception later in the novel. We are told that she has no beauty as soon as
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we meet her, and by the end of the first chapter we are left with the impression that the
depth of her reflexivity is at least partly a result of its being a sole and secret resource in
the midst of her impoverished life. This impression is deepened in chapter two: Mrs.
Gereth’s story of her accumulation of the treasures at Poynton proves “fascinating to poor
Fleda; who hadn’t a penny in the world nor anything nice at home, and whose only
treasure was her subtle mind”:
Fleda, with her mother dead, hadn’t so much as even a home, and her
nearest chance of one was that there was some appearance her sister would
become engaged to a curate whose eldest brother was supposed to have
property and would perhaps allow him something. Her father paid some
of her bills but didn’t like her to live with him; and she had lately, in Paris,
with several hundred other young women, spent a year at a studio, arming
herself for the battle of life by a course with an impressionist painter (14).
To readers in fin-de-siècle England this description of Fleda’s background and prospects
would have resounded more pitifully than it does today; perhaps they would have been
less hasty to criticize her “ethical absolutism,” aware that for a girl in her situation her
pretensions to gentility, not to mention her room and board, depended almost entirely on
her reputation for correct and obliging behavior.
Edith Wharton’s House of Mirth, published within a few years of Spoils, is
probably one of the period’s most frightening examples of the dangers confronting a
penniless young woman trying to stay afloat in late Victorian society, usually in the hope
of marrying into security. For such women this usually meant living with wealthier
friends, rotating among them often enough to avoid seeming “parasitical” and cultivating
charm and helpfulness to make themselves seem indispensable (41). Fleda and Mrs.
Gereth share a genuine bond in their affection for Poynton, but as the novel progresses
Fleda feels more and more that her value to Mrs. Gereth is “the mere value…of a good
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agent;” and although Mrs. Gereth can afford to override the material gulf separating the
women’s perspectives, with the unconscious insolence of a life spent in a “true fool’s
paradise,” Fleda cannot, and she is hypersensitive to anything that may place her in a
false position (36, 12). Within weeks of Fleda’s arrival at Poynton Mrs. Gereth has
placed her in a grotesque position (even by modern standards) by presenting her to the
unsuspecting Owen as a superior alternative to his brand new fiancée, and Fleda’s sense
of humiliation and outrage is compounded by “a sore scared perception” that her value to
Mrs. Gereth is only as great as her value to Poynton (36). Such a situation deepens her
sense of insecurity and awakens her sense of Mrs. Gereth’s “inhumanity,” which comes
to be associated with Mrs. Gereth’s “immorality” as the novel progresses (37, 77). It also
deepens her sense of the awkwardness of her position at Poynton, and the anxiety and
instability involved in her relationship with Mrs. Gereth contributes to Fleda’s growing
love for Owen, who is unconscious of the possibility of despising Fleda for her presence
in his home. Fleda finds it “exquisite” that “whereas…for her kind little circle at large,
who didn’t now at all matter, her tendency had begun to define itself as parasitical, this
strong young man, who had a right to judge and even to loathe her, didn’t judge and
didn’t loathe, let her down gently, treated her as if she pleased him—in fact evidently
liked her to be just where she was” (41).
In short, Fleda’s delicacy may be as much a function and necessity of her
dependent condition as it is a free expression of her sense of taste, and her clearsightedness more likely to be confused with her instincts for self-preservation than it
would have been had her social position been more established. If we read Spoils in the
light of shorter works like A London Life and In the Cage the connection between her
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sense of delicacy and her precarious social footing becomes even clearer and gives us
reason to think that James’s judgment of Fleda as “free” might have been one he would
have wanted to qualify on more thorough consideration. In the Cage was published the
year after The Spoils of Poynton and was eventually published with What Maisie Knew in
the eleventh volume of the New York edition. The story’s protagonist is an unnamed
postal worker who compensates for her low social status and dreary prospects by
constructing imaginative scenarios around the telegrams passed into her cage by her rich
and beautifully bedecked customers. Her scenarios are not romantic fantasies but
genuine intuitions that allow her to enjoy a sense of superiority over her fellow workers
and her counter-clerk fiancé and eventually gain the attention of a handsome gentleman
named Captain Everhard. Her triumph is James’s version of the Cinderalla story—of the
poor girl whose virtue and native delicacy is validated by homage from the Prince in the
form of a marriage proposal and the opportunity to display her worth before the highest
people in the land. The catch is that sometimes the Prince is not virtuous enough to see
beyond the girl’s social status, and his homage rises no higher than an attempt at
seduction. Such is the case with Captain Everhard. Instead of being surprised, however,
the unnamed postal worker has had no illusions about the possibility of marriage and asks
only that she have opportunity to serve him in a way that allows her to maintain her sense
of superiority and personal integrity. She is granted her wish, avoiding seduction and
helping the Captain out of what she discovers in the end to be a less heroic situation than
she had imagined, her personal needs and outsider status having finally clouded her
vision. A London Life, published with Spoils in the tenth volume of the New York
edition, illustrates the difficulty of maintaining a spotless reputation in the face of social
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and economic pressure. The story’s protagonist Laura Wing is driven to propose to a
man she barely knows to escape dispossession and social disgrace when her married
sister, who provided the roof over Laura’s head, elopes with another man. Laura
manages to recoup her dignity and marry respectably only through the intervention of a
kind and wealthy older woman, who unlike Mrs. Gereth is more genuinely concerned for
her young friend’s well-being.
Like the unnamed protagonist of In the Cage, Fleda’s powers of perception,
though great, are limited and even partly motivated by her need to maintain an illusion of
self-respect, and her rejection of Owen is based less on her capacity to see the situation
with more clarity than either Owen or Mrs. Gereth than on a deep awareness of her social
insecurity, combined with a reluctance to have this insecurity acknowledged by others.
The version of the situation that Mrs. Gereth throws out at Fleda in the “high insolence”
of her anger is precisely the version Fleda has been attempting to spare herself because it
strips her of her pretense to self-respect, of the illusion that she can in fact “be someone”
despite her social expendability, and also, she thinks, because it places her so thoroughly
at the mercy of others. The morals and manners that Mrs. Gereth often lacks are what
save Fleda (she believes) from being as victimized as she could be, and her refusal to
surrender them does preserve her freedom if we understand freedom as Fleda understands
it, as escaping being viewed by others—and having to view herself—as a vulgar golddigger, one whose lack of beauty would fail to provide even the smallest amount of social
expiation for her marriage.
We can see these fears at work in Fleda in her pivotal scenes with Owen, which
occur in the dingy drawing rooms of her father’s and her sister’s homes: the “brandy-
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flasks and pen-wipers” cluttering her father’s house, the “smutty maid,” and “the coarse
cups saucers and the vulgar little plates” all contribute to her exaggerated awareness of
Owen’s pity for her poverty (in their first rendezvous he only just refrained from trying to
buy her a dress) and her desperate sense that she must do her best not to seem as pitiful as
her situation looks (153-7). The “stunted slavey gazing wide-eyed at the beautiful
gentlemen and either stupidly or cunningly bringing but one [tea] thing at a time”—
gawking at Owen as if he were a celebrity—provides the reader with a wry view of how
far out of her league Fleda is, as well as how liable under duress to fall into the same kind
of unconscious class judgments she suspects Mrs. Gereth of making (155). Her reason
for refusing to help Owen out of his engagement, which she wails out seconds before she
flees their final scene at her sister’s house (and the last time she sees him) reveals the
complex motivations behind her consistent determination to refrain from all but “high
and delicate deed[s]”:
‘You mustn’t break faith. Anything’s better than that. You must at any
rate be utterly sure. She must love you—how can she help it? I wouldn’t
give you up…She spoke in broken bits, panting out her words. “The great
thing is to keep faith. Where’s a man if he doesn’t? If he doesn’t he may
be so cruel. So cruel, so cruel, so cruel!’ Fleda repeated. I couldn’t have
a hand in that, you know: that’s my position—that’s mine. You offered
her marriage. It’s a tremendous thing for her.’ Then looking at him
another moment, ‘I wouldn’t give you up!’ She said again…‘Never, never,
never!’ she cried; and before he could succeed in seizing her she had
turned and, flashing up the stairs, got away from him even faster than she
had got away at Ricks (106, 196-7).
“Not breaking faith” is important because it protects women like her from the “cruelty”
of men—from being even more vulnerable than they are in a society in which men have
every right but the right of breaking their word to a woman. In this society the only thing
that protects women from being completely exploited as Fleda is afraid of being
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exploited is the code of honor that forces men to behave like gentlemen. She is afraid
that breaking his engagement to Mona will be a proof of his inconstancy, and Fleda has
even more to lose from involving herself with an inconstant man than Mona. In fact,
what looks like sympathy for Mona is actually a projection of her needs and insecurities
on to Mona: “I wouldn’t give you up,” she emphasizes twice, “You offered her marriage.
It’s a tremendous thing for her”.
As feminists have reminded us, the tragedy associated with gender inequality is
that it prevents people from relating to each other as individuals—from exercising the
sensitivity to the particular necessary to foster honest and egalitarian relationships. Three
people with three different perspectives have recognized that Mona does not love Owen
and that she is holding on to him only in the hopes of becoming mistress of a restored
Poynton, but Mona’s membership in an oppressed class seems to entitle her to
consideration on that basis alone. In fact, her mercenary behavior is almost legitimatized
in such a society; Fleda seems to imply that robbing Mona of a “tremendous” marriage is
just as unfair as it would be to rob her of a man she loved, that in the former situation she
is just as bereft as she would be in the latter. On the other hand, Owen has given proof
that he is more than just a fickle boy. Although handsome and weak, he has enough
sense to have appreciated Fleda’s superior qualities long before Mona makes the contrast
seem as great as she eventually does; he also continually exhibits a great deal of natural
tact and delicacy. Yet his membership in the oppressor class denies him consideration on
that basis alone; he “must marry a woman [he] hate[s]” in order to uphold his role as an
honorable gentleman (196).
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We can multiply reasons why Fleda’s lapse in clarity is understandable in her
situation. Enough inequality still exists in our own culture to make us doubt the motives
of a popular handsome man who is engaged to a beautiful successful woman but
suddenly becomes obsessed with a poor ugly girl for her spiritual and moral qualities
alone. Even now in such a situation the man must prove his faithfulness unless the ugly
girl receives indisputable proof that the other woman is a “bitch” (and we should remind
herself that Fleda never sees Mona’s bitchiness first hand); otherwise she has only herself
to blame when she is left for another woman. The comparative freedom we have to get
impatient with Fleda for not hustling down “to the Registrar” as Mrs. Gereth thought they
should is not a freedom Fleda has in the same degree. We may recognize that Mona’s
bitchiness, Owen’s innocence and Fleda’s own needs, which are much greater than
Mona’s (Mona still has a home of her own, for example), provide plenty of justification
for making an exception, but Fleda does not. Even Owen, who is a member of the
oppressor class feels the pressure of the honor code, although perhaps with less excuse
for seeing around it (he is weak, as Fleda herself acknowledges). Mrs. Gereth tries to
show Fleda that acknowledging her desperation—surrendering to it, so to speak—can be
a liberating choice, but Mrs. Gereth speaks from a privileged position herself—her choice
is between a greater and lesser home, not between a home and nothing at all. More
importantly, however, Mrs. Gereth is unable to show Fleda the beauty and higher
morality involved in such a choice. Mrs. Gereth has sacrificed her dignity for her love of
her possessions, a choice that puts her on par with Mona; Fleda needs to be shown that to
sacrifice her dignity for her love of others is ultimately not a sacrifice of her dignity at all,
but rather a path to greater freedom and a higher dignity.

24

To summarize, then, we can say that Fleda is the most perceptive and the freest
character in the novel but that her vision of her own situation is clouded—though
understandably so—by her fear of acknowledging her own social and economic
vulnerability. Her perceptivity is even in a certain sense a defense mechanism, which
makes it more likely to fail when asked to peer through her shield of pride. Of course it
does fail: her fear causes her to cling to an overly refined honor code that keeps her from
seizing a chance for security and happiness when it literally throws itself into her lap.
Such a reading would seem to put me on the side of critics who have agreed with R. P.
Blackmur that James was “uncertain of his intention” in Spoils and against those who
have claimed that James’s characterization of Fleda is correct.5
Richard Hocks, a member of this latter group, suggests that in her final scene with
Owen Fleda’s apparent projection of her own feelings onto Mona is actually “just the
reverse: it is conceiving of each person as so distinctly individual that you are willing to
continually subsume your own views into them rather than classify them as Other, which
would then take the spark of human life and dignity out of them—one which you know is
there because you have it yourself.”6 Though acknowledging that this scene is
problematic, particularly when Fleda “characteristically retreats ‘upstairs’ (like a
Victorian heroine),” Hocks claims that Fleda’s real lapses of vision occur when she falls
under Mrs. Gereth’s influence after her scene with Owen and attempts to recall him with
a telegram and when, in the last chapter, she seeks to memorialize her virtue with one of
the relics of Poynton, only to be rebuked by a fiery reminder that life always escape one’s
attempts to idealize it.7 In the scene with Owen, on the other hand, Fleda becomes so
determined not to do injustice to any possible aspect of the Other (Mona, in this case) that
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she refrains from discriminating altogether, falling back instead on her awareness of how
she herself would like to be treated in the same situation.
In this ingenious reading Hock seems to be suggesting that when a response is
required in the absence of knowledge of all the particulars of situation the best thing to do
is to act in a way that gives the other participants the benefit of the doubt. I agree with
this suggestion; we are occasionally called upon to make decisions or pass judgments
without hearing all the evidence—or at least as much of the evidence as we need to make
an “informed” decision—and we should always respond with generosity, treating others
as we would like to be treated in the same situation, refraining from all but a loving
attribution of the best motives in one’s ignorance of any others. Such situations enact the
ordinary version of the dilemma I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the one
supersensitive perceivers face with each decision they make: how to draw boundaries—
how to determine when one has reviewed all the evidence–when “really experience ends
nowhere.” We expect supersensitive perceivers like Fleda to hesitate when ordinary
people would consider the evidence sufficient; but the interesting thing about Fleda in her
interview with Owen is that she does not hesitate—instead she acts on a plan formed a
month in advance, one she formed as soon as she realized that Owen wanted her to help
him break off his engagement. Her reasoning was not that as an individual Mona
deserves the right be “morally present” in any decision that concerns her but that Owen is
honor bound to keep his promises: “nobody had a right to get off easily from pledges so
deep and sacred,” she concludes (106).
Our opponent could counter that pledges and honor really stand for Mona’s rights
and feelings in Fleda’s internal monologue, so we should probably look at it more
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carefully. Interestingly, Fleda acknowledges that Mona does not appreciate the pledge as
she herself would and that her own decision not to intervene may “keep [Owen] tied to an
affection that had died a sudden and violent death” (106-7). She asks herself how a
decision made to keep Owen from dishonorable behavior could mean condemning him to
a relationship with a woman he dislikes, and comes to the conclusion that his likes and
dislikes are none of her business:
She had nothing to do with his dislikes; she had only to do with his good
nature and his good name. She had joy of him just as he was, but it was of
these things she had the greatest. The worst aversion and the liveliest
wouldn’t alter the fact—since one was facing facts—that but the other day
his strong arms must have a clasped a remarkably handsome girl as close
as she had permitted. Fleda’s emotion at this time was a wondrous
mixture, in which Mona’s permissions and Mona’s beauty figured
powerfully as aids to reflexion. She herself had no beauty, and her
permissions were the stony stares she had just practiced in the drawing
room—a consciousness of a kind appreciably to add to the strange sense
of triumph that made her generous (107-8).
From here Fleda goes on to hope that despite her generosity Mona will become tired of
the engagement and break it off herself, but we need to look closely at this passage to
explain Fleda’s motivation in promoting Owen’s honor over his happiness and see if we
can answer Hock’s reading fully. First of all we see that Fleda appreciates Owen’s good
nature and good name more than she appreciates anything else about him. We have
already seen that Fleda appreciates his good nature at least partly because it relieves her
of the feelings of vulnerability she feels around Mrs. Gereth and others, and we can add
that she also enjoys the power Owen’s good nature gives her over him; there is a sense in
which his own quickening perception later in the novel is repugnant because it threatens
her control of the situation. From the very beginning she is attracted to Owen because he
is “a force grateful for direction” (11). When Mrs. Gereth accuses Owen of being

27

“disgustingly weak,” Fleda retorts, “it’s because he’s weak that he needs me” (225). His
good nature is important to her for a variety of selfish (though understandable) reasons
and his good name is probably important for similar ones, since her own reputation is an
important part of her defense system. Secondly, the most relevant fact about Mona seems
to be that she has enjoyed Owen’s caresses. Fleda seems here to assume that physical
love is sacred and that it automatically creates obligations that it would be morally wrong
to ignore. Even today many people have respect for individuals of both sexes who
assume that physical encounters entail some sort of obligation to the other; likewise,
Fleda can be respected so far as not being virtuous is an option for her. However the
important question is whether she should be respected for keeping Owen under an
obligation that Mona herself does not recognize—for forcing Owen to honor a promise
that obviously means nothing to the woman it was meant to protect. Does not keeping
this promise really damage Owen’s honor, or does it merely deny Fleda the appearance of
moral superiority that she needs to enjoy? We can see in the last part of her rumination
that her “triumph” over Mona’s superior beauty and greater “permissions” fuels much of
her desire to act with scrupulous graciousness; she is conscious even here that her moral
sensibility is what has given her the edge.
One of the underlying assumptions of Hock’s argument is that perceptions are not
accurate if they are not constantly verified by the presence of the perceived object. Hock
takes this idea from William James, whose more skeptical pragmaticism he mistakenly
attributes to Henry. As H.S. Thayer points out in his the introduction to the Harvard
edition of The Meaning of Truth, William James made the mistake frequently associated
with poststructuralists of confusing conceptualization (or perception, as we have been
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calling it) with attempts to arrive at fixed or absolute knowledge of something or
someone.8 Every idea presents itself as absolute truth and is therefore suspect; so in order
for us to avoid delusion we must constantly verify the concept—physically verify it—by
bringing it into the presence of the object in question. Therefore the only way Fleda can
have an accurate perception of Mona’s feelings and rights is if Mona is in the room
revealing her rights and feelings; otherwise Fleda is doing the most honest thing in
avoiding imagining anything. Unfortunately for Hock, Henry James’s novels do not
evince the same skepticism towards language and conceptualization that William’s
philosophy does. We have already seen that Fleda’s decision is not based on an
observation of Mona’s needs and desire; the conflict is between Fleda’s love for Owen
and her preconceived notions of honor, not between her love for Owen and her obligation
to do justice to every possible version of the situation. Even if it were, however, James
gives us little indication that we should doubt the facts of the case because Fleda has not
had them from Mona herself. Owen is a reliable narrator and the wedding has not
appeared in the papers; these facts are good enough for James.
What about James’s characterization of Fleda? He praised her freedom in the
preface of the New York edition, ten years after the original publication of Spoils. The
judgment seems to have been borne of ripe reflection and may seem to damage to my
claim that James’s use of ambiguity is always deliberate, although not my claim that
ambiguity is present in the text, since we know that a text may reveal intentions of which
the author himself is unaware. In this case I may have to agree with Blackmur and other
critics who have argued that James was never fully aware of his own intentions in Spoils.
Spoils is the second novel in what has come to be called James “experimental period,” a
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period in which he began to try out more radical narrative techniques after a failed
attempt at playwriting and may not have fully realized the implications of employing
narrators who are both disinterested and profoundly implicated in everything they relate.
We can also conjecture that James himself, like his narrator, retained an admiration for
conventional morality—for supersensitive notions of honor—throughout his life; there is
a degree to which his own dedication to manner and delicacy—his disgust for
“vulgarity”—may have caused him to shrink from pushing perception as far as it would
go. As much as he may have appreciated the beauty of conventional morality (especially
when contrasted with the kind of licentiousness portrayed in the antepenultimate chapter
of The Awkward Age), careful readings of both the experimental novels and the later
novels reveal that he was increasingly ambivalent about it, aware that a devotion to
anything that claimed such absolute allegiance could betray many of the contingencies
that characterize life. A simpler explanation of James’s comments, one that does more
justice to his authorial consciousness, is that “free” means “comparatively free.” None of
James’s reflexive narrators are completely free; they all have some blind spot or
limitation that they either face or do not face but that stalls their attempts at complete
understanding either way. But to say that they lack the capacity for disinterested
reflection that many of the other characters (in what works) more patently lack is
extreme, especially since James relies on these characters to present all the subtleties of
the drama.
This brings us to the question of Fleda’s reliability as a narrator. If her freedom is
compromised in one area, how do we know it is not completely compromised? Can we
trust her evaluations of Owen and Mrs. Gereth? Can we rely on her recognition of the
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truth of Mrs. Gereth’s accusation at the moment she is giving proof of her capacity for
blindness—and does this blindness cast suspicion on everything she has reported to us up
until that point? Could her whole story be a fabrication, an attempt to convince both
reader and actors that she is a sweet moral lamb so that she can more easily manipulate
the Gereths out of Poynton, as Robert C. McLean has suggested?9 The interpretation
would go something like this: Fleda decides that she wants Poynton as soon as she sees it,
seduces Owen under the guise of acting as ambassador between him and his mother,
hides her duplicity from Mrs. Gereth so that Mrs. Gereth will steal the furniture and
Mona will break the engagement, leaving Fleda with her reputation intact. Meanwhile
Fleda has nothing to do but make a show of trying to patch things up and blame her
failure on her moral scruples. Unfortunately, however, Mrs. Gereth catches on to her
duplicity and sends the furniture back before Mona has a chance to break off the
engagement. With work we could probably make most of the details of the novel cohere
with this interpretation; however, the problem seems to me to be that Fleda herself gives
no clues that she is capable of manipulation on this level. Her lies and deceptions are
more readily explained by the motives I have already imputed to her—her fears and
insecurities—for which there is an abundance of evidence in the text. Irony rarely works
unless we have some clues of its existence; and even in a text like The Turn of the Screw,
which has been accused of leaving too few clues to a possible ironic interpretation, the
narrator is still more deceived than deceiving, as I have been claiming that Fleda is here.
As I have already pointed out, characters as thoroughly evil as Fleda would be if she had
concocted such a seamless fabrication are extremely rare in James’s fiction.
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Moreover, Spoils is not written from first-person point-of-view but from thirdperson limited, a distance that frequently widens into third-person omniscience, and the
omniscient narrator himself gives us clues to the way we are supposed to interpret Fleda’s
lapses in clarity, the most obvious of which is her name. He also warns us in Chapter
One that Fleda “has even from herself wonderful secrets of delicacy and pride,” speaking
gently of her “little life” and “meagre past” (10). Her pride and her meager past are the
readers’ clues to her lapse in perception later in the novel. We are told that she has no
beauty as soon as we meet her, and by the end of the first chapter, when Fleda’s voice
takes over, we already have the impression that the depth of her reflexivity is at least
partly a result of its being a sole and secret resource in the midst of her impoverished life.
But we are also left with the impression that her reflexivity, though limited, is a genuine
ability and generally trustworthy, and much greater than that of the other participants in
the story. If nothing else, our own life experience has shown us that people who are very
perceptive about others are often blinkered about themselves, but that this need not
destroy their credibility except in this one area. And again, all of James narrators have
blind spots somewhere.
If we agree that Fleda is extraordinarily perceptive except in this one area I want
to point out how her perceptivity affects her love for Owen and her concern for others
and how it would have continued to affect these things had she been able to sustain it.
First of all, we can see that Fleda’s imagination has enriched her love for Owen from the
very beginning, enabling her to see more value in him than either his mother or his
fiancée has seen. Her love for Owen has never been blind; in fact, the text introduces us
to Fleda’s perceptivity as she is evaluating Owen in their initial meeting. Amused to find
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herself walking next to Owen, Fleda is aware that Mrs. Gereth has orchestrated the
walking arrangements:
Fleda had other amusements as well, such as noting that Mrs. Gereth was
now with Mona Brigstock; such as observing that she was all affability to
that young woman; such as reflecting that, masterful and clever, with a
great bright spirit, she was one of those who impose, who interfuse
themselves; such as feeling finally that Owen Gereth was absolutely
beautiful and delightfully dense. This young person had even from herself
wonderful secrets of delicacy and pride; but she came as near distinctness
as in the consideration of such matters she had ever come at all in now
embracing the idea that it was of a pleasant effect and more remarkable
indeed than to be clever and horrid. Owen Gereth at any rate, with his
inches, his features and his lapses, was neither of these latter things. She
herself was prepared, if she should ever marry, to contribute all the
cleverness, and she liked to figure it out that her husband would be a force
grateful for direction. She was in her own small way a spirit of the same
family as Mrs. Gereth. On that flushed and huddled Sunday a great matter
occurred; her little life became aware of a singular quickening. Her
meagre past fell away from her like a garment of the wrong fashion, and
as she came up to on the Monday what she stared at from the train in the
suburban fields was a future full of things she distinctly loved (10-11).
I have quoted from this passage already, but I quote it here in full because it illustrates
just how closely Fleda’s imagination is connected to her love for Owen. From the
beginning her attraction to Owen is rooted in a subtle awareness of his character, though
it may not be rooted in a very thorough awareness of her own. (If she had recognized her
own weakness would she have wanted a weak partner?) She is extremely aware of his
physical beauty—his “inches and his features”—which suggests that the attraction is
erotic. We are never allowed to forget how attractive he really is and how hard Fleda
works to keep from being overly influenced by it, most notably in their walk through the
park. She obviously overcompensates for reasons we have already made clear, but the
desire to avoid being overly influenced by the superficial attraction does not keep her
from feeling and valuing it. In fact her appreciation for his attractiveness is compounded
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by her susceptibility to beauty in general, and we often get the impression that her
“exquisite taste” enables her to do greater justice even to his most obvious features than
most of the people around them do.
More unusually, she feels the interest in the particular character of his density, a
quality rarely associated with charm and “delightfulness.” To see the difference between
an individual who is just dumb and beautiful (Brett Ashley in The Sun Also Rises) and
one whose density has a great deal of charm (Daisy Buchanan in Gatsby) takes a
discriminating eye, especially because the latter phenomenon is so rarely seen in men.
Although I have already pointed out, using this passage, that Fleda overrates this
quality—continually confusing it with his “good nature” and honesty—she nevertheless
does it greater justice than either his mother or his fiancée do. And even when she is
attempting to preserve his density and innocence at the expense of other unfolding
qualities, she retains the capacity to recognize the latter; she can even see when and by
whom he is being influenced. As Hocks himself rather perceptively remarks, the way
Fleda words her observations of Owen demonstrates her ability to take in new
impressions of him just as they reveal themselves.10 Encountering Owen on a shopping
trip soon after she leaves Poynton, she notices that “he unduly prolonged their business
together, giving Fleda a sense of his putting off something particular that he had to face.
If she had ever dreamed of Owen Gereth as finely fluttered she would have seen him with
some such manner as this” (63). The simultaneous movement and hesitancy of her
judgment here—the way she compares her previous knowledge of Owen, as well as her
knowledge of the way most people act when fluttered, with this new impression,
acknowledging that it conforms to what she might have thought but that she is still open
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to further revelations—is paradigmatic of the way of her perceptivity works.
Generalizations from previous impressions are brought up for comparison but are held in
cautious suspension before the new data, waiting to be confirmed, altered, or denied.
This movement is particularly evident in Fleda’s interaction with Owen as we see her
initial impressions being deepened and qualified by succeeding ones, and it is easy to see
how her impressionability encourages her love for Owen. Suspending one’s
preconceived notions of who people are and how they should act in order to genuinely
experience them requires a great deal of courage and tenacity; it is a fundamentally
selfless act (Owen certainly recognizes it as such), a reaching out to the Other that we
recognize to be a major component of what we usually call genuine love. People who
lack the capacity for imaginative empathy (as Nussbaum calls it) usually have a hard time
sustaining loving partnerships; those who are interested in having more than a brief fling
are forced to develop these capacity to a certain degree, since it is usually impossible to
act on another’s behalf unless one has made some sort of effort to understand who the
other person is and what his or her needs are. Those who have developed this capacity
before they “fall in love” are less likely to get stuck in immature relationships or to make
choices based on superficial or unexamined emotions; the extent to which we wonder
whether or not Owen is the right person for Fleda, for example, is just the extent to which
we recognize her to be operating on fear instead of an awareness of who Owen is.
Obviously cultivating perception does not always lead to love. What I am
suggesting is that cultivating perception, especially the kind of responsible perception
Fleda cultivates, can lead to love, that it can deepen love that begins as a mere “animal”
attraction or it can steer one clear of this if one is looking for something more significant.
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The unthinking erotic element is always present in romantic love, as it is for Fleda and
Owen in their heightened awareness of each other, but mutual empathy as well as a
commitment to the value of that empathy—to the importance of acting on it, of taking it
seriously—is also required. On the other hand, if the erotic element is absent, romantic
love may not be possible but responsible perception can still help lead to other kinds of
love. It is interesting to see how Fleda’s determination to do justice to Mrs. Gereth (for
whatever reasons) eventually leads to a genuine friendship between the two women. This
occurs partly because Mrs. Gereth is finally forced to develop a larger imagination herself
as a result of her dramatic failure—brought about primarily because of her monomaniacal
outlook on life—to achieve her goals, but also because as much as Fleda has seen wrong
in Mrs. Gereth’s outlook (and as much as she has personally suffered from it) she has
looked deeply and thoroughly enough to see what is “great” and what can be respected
and admired in Mrs. Gereth in spite of her faults.
In James’s novels perceptive people can almost always find beauty in everyone—
we see this most nobly and notably in Lambert Strether in The Ambassadors. Fleda, we
should remind ourselves, is the only character in Spoils who manages to “see something”
in Mona from beginning to end. We can also see that her ability to “see something” in
Mona and everyone else is something more than tolerance or being non-judgmental.
Tolerance may be no more than a willingness to “live and let live”; a tolerant person may
refuse to see beyond his or her own perspective, recognizing that other people have
different perspectives, but be unwilling to see the value in these perspectives, which is
why tolerance can sometimes seem to have more in common with selfish indifference
than with genuine understanding. Fleda not only recognizes that other people see things
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differently but that these perspectives have value and interest. As limited as Mrs.
Gereth’s perspective is, for example, Fleda is capable of appreciating it—she loves the
treasures of Poynton just as much as Mrs. Gereth does, though not as exclusively as Mrs.
Gereth does. Her willingness not just to see these perspectives but to do justice to their
value, if not to herself than to others, makes her outlook both more than tolerant and more
than the kind of cold-hearted clear-headedness that we have already associated with
Kierkegaard’s seducer or with the attitude Mrs. Brook in The Awkward Age attempts to
adopt.
We could call it simply “imaginative empathy” were it not for our recognition that
“the ability to understand what another person is thinking or feeling [the standard
philosophical definition of empathy] does not always conduce to compassionate action,”
whereas Fleda’s empathy always ends in compassionate action, even if the action is as
small as an attempt to acknowledge (either to herself or to others) the existential value of
the other viewpoint.11 We could call it compassionate empathy (or just compassion) were
it not that compassion usually includes the beliefs that the person deserving compassion
is suffering and that that suffering is not really his or her fault.12 A perceptive person
tends to maintain a more inclusive definition of suffering and victimization than an
average person does—Fleda seems to feel that Mrs. Gereth is in some sense a victim of
her blinkered obsession, for example—but because this larger kind of victimization does
not, according to most people, qualify the sufferer for compassion, we might want to
hesitate to call what Fleda feels compassionate empathy, since she feels it for people who
may not seem to need compassion in the ordinary sense. Since Fleda extends concerned
empathy to everyone she encounters without quibbling over whether or not each
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individual deserves it, we should avoid calling her actions compassionate. Her actions
are best described as charitable, a word that Fleda uses at least once to describe her
obligations to characters in the novel (147). Charity usually connotes actions greater than
merely perceiving, though; whereas “neighborly love,” which is frequently used as a
synonym for charity, often indicates the presence of an emotion not always present in
perception (unlike Nussbaum, I do not believe that the cognitive components of an
emotion are sufficient for producing that emotion, though they are necessary to it). The
best thing to call it is “responsible perception”: it is the cultivation of an extremely subtle
awareness plus a commitment to the existential importance of the qualities of which one
is aware. It is a belief that perception is a moral duty. If we can attribute to James any
allegiance to what might be called a prescriptive morality we can attribute to him the
allegiance to the duty of being “one of the people on whom nothing is lost,” a goal that is
coextensive with moral integrity, as his critical works show. We can see how devotion to
such a duty automatically orients us towards taking the Other seriously; it is conducive to
friendship, as it is in Fleda’s friendship with Mrs. Gereth, as well as to mature versions of
romantic love. Responsible perception is not identical with love but tends to be present
when love is present, and as we have seen, it also tends to encourage feelings of goodwill
and affection towards others by making them objects of concern.
Before moving on to novels that demand (for our purposes) less intricate readings
I want to make several more observations about responsible perception based on an
imaginative construction of what Fleda would have said and done had she maintained her
openness throughout the length of her ordeal. We are back at the kind of question that I
initially suggested that James’s novels intend for us to ask: what would Fleda have

38

thought and done had she been more honest with herself, and what would the
consequences of this have been? Our answer to this question will reveal several further
benefits to cultivating responsible perception—benefits that will also demonstrate how
closely love and perception are related. As we have seen, at the root of Fleda’s lapse in
imagination is her inattention to herself: she is frightened of her own desires and
vulnerability. This not only prevents her marrying Owen but forces him to marry a
woman he “hates” and robs Mrs. Gereth of her beautiful home. It also reinforces Mona’s
selfishness and greed. On the other hand, none of these things would have happened had
Fleda said to herself, “Certainly in most situations people should stick to their promises,
especially in a society in which women could become even more vulnerable if men were
to treat their engagements lightly. However, this particular situation is exceptional. For
one thing, I love Owen—so much so that I am able to encourage his happiness even if
means helping him hasten his marriage to someone else. Secondly, Mona does not love
him—or if she does, she does not love him for the right reasons. She loves his home as
much as she loves him, and she doesn’t even love his home for the right reasons, which
are those that show the most nuanced appreciation of everything Owen and Poynton are.
Thirdly, Owen sees that Mona does not love him and he loves me partly because I am
different from her, because he senses and values qualities in me that she does not possess
right now, not least my capacity to love him for more than his possessions. He may also
love me because his mother has planted the idea in his head or because he is experiencing
“cold feet” over his upcoming nuptials, but I know him well enough to know that purer
feelings are there and that I would be cultivating them if the two of us were married. It is
true that I would be robbing Mona of the prestige of Poynton, but I would not be robbing
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her of a home. She will always have Waterbath, and a broken engagement is not an
irreversible stain on a girl’s character, especially for a girl like Mona who is stronger than
I and can rebound from almost anything. In contrast I am homeless and penniless and
will have nothing but my pride if I let it stand in the way of accepting Owen. Moreover,
Mona’s plans for Poynton, which include throwing out a “winter garden” as soon as she
gets here, are a travesty I should prevent if I can prevent it without sacrificing the feelings
of other human beings, as Mrs. Gereth often does. If Mona had any real feelings for
Owen or Poynton interfering would be wrong—but if she did, neither Owen nor Mrs.
Gereth would want me to interfere. By marrying Owen I can make myself happy and
secure for the rest of my life without sacrificing Owen or Mrs. Gereth’s happiness. I can
reconcile Mrs. Gereth with her son (she certainly needs to treat him better) and teach
Owen to appreciate his mother and to appreciate her exquisite artistic taste. Perhaps this
will help Mona be more considerate of her next lover. Perhaps it will also show people
that love is greater than pride and throw a small kink into this ghastly class system.”
One of the things this speech shows us is that self-awareness and selfresponsibility help cultivate awareness of and responsibility towards others. Fleda is
under the mistaken impression that her love for Owen and her desire to improve her own
situation will make her do an injustice to Mona, to Owen himself (by robbing him of his
“natural honesty” and integrity), and to a certain extent Mrs. Gereth, by seeming to
validate Mrs.Gereth’s right to confiscate the spoils and manipulate Owen. In respect to
herself and the crisis in which she finds herself she never considers the possibility that
sensitivity to the particular may have a higher moral priority than adherence to an
absolute ideal, though she obviously feels the validity of this activity when addressing the
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needs of others. As we have seen, this lack of self-awareness prevents her from doing
full justice to all the particulars of other people’s situations as well as her own. If she had
questioned her adherence to “Thou shalt not help a man break his engagement,” asking
herself what psychological motivation lay behind such an extreme commitment to honor,
she might have been able to face her fears and distinguish between unhealthy motivations
and healthy ones, the later of which may include letting go of her pride and honor and
letting herself be vulnerable. She may also have recognized similar fears operating in
Owen, who has been bossed and belittled by his mother his whole life and may be bossed
and belittled for the rest of it if he marries Mona, and whose reluctance to break with
Mona is as much a sign of weakness as of any sense of honor. She may also have had
more sympathy for Mrs. Gereth, who like Fleda is a victim of a patriarchal social and
legal system and who is in consequence being thrown out of the home she has created
and governed for many years.
One of Fleda’s most interesting lapses in empathy is her failure to enter into Mrs.
Gereth’s frustration over the loss of personal dignity that the dispossession entails. She
empathizes with Mrs. Gereth’s feelings for the spoils, but she does scant justice to Mrs.
Gereth’s “long resentment” over “the effacement to which English usage reduced the
widowed mother” (49). Fleda reports Mrs. Gereth’s resentment but the text makes clear
that she does not enter into it as she enters into Mrs. Gereth’s feelings for Poynton;
instead Fleda’s feelings are all for Owen on this particular issue. She never questions her
duty “to help him to live as a gentleman and carry through what he had undertaken; her
problem was to reinstate him in his rights”; and her failure to question whether these
rights are after all right is of a piece with her failure to question the honor code that keeps
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him tied to Mona (95). All these lapses in sympathy can be linked to her lapses in similar
areas of self-understanding, and that her responsibility to herself is connected to her
responsibility to others. This point is important because of the close link that I have been
suggesting exists between responsible perception and love. A distinguished history of
religious and philosophical thought has suggested that self-love and love for others are
incompatible, whereas if we understand love to be a combination of responsible
perception (typically accompanied by more apparent acts of altruism) and unqualifiable
but appropriate emotions and feelings, whether these be romantic, filial or friendly
feelings, we can suggest that self-love may be as important to love for others as
responsible self-perception is to responsible perception of others.
A second point illustrated by our hypothetical fully-perceptive Fleda is that an
individual’s sensitivity towards one person need not conflict with his or her sensitivity
towards another. A common misconception about love is that some forms of it are in
tension with other forms; the most prevalent of these beliefs is that erotic love in its
obsessive exclusivity conflicts with familial or friendly love. Religious thinkers have
often claimed that eros and philia collide with Christian agape. Without attempting to
determine how compatible agape is with secular loves of various sorts, I can at least point
out that Fleda’s love for Owen, if it had been characterized by responsible awareness
throughout, would not have conflicted with her friendship for his mother. The apparent
discord comes only with Fleda’s devotion to uncritical notions of rights and honor. If
Fleda had seen the claims of both mother and son with greater clarity she might have
achieved some sort of reconciliation between them from the very beginning. Her role at
Poynton and later at Ricks is to be ambassador between the mother and son: Mrs. Gereth
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sends her out to talk sense into Owen and he sends her back to try to persuade his mother,
and Fleda pretends to do both but really does neither. She tells Owen his mother is
softening (she is not) and encourages hopes in Mrs. Gereth that she herself feels to be
vain. Part of her stated reluctance to fulfill her mission is that though she is visiting
Poynton at Mrs. Gereth’s request she has fallen in love with Owen early in her visit and
has consequently switched sides. She now wants to help Owen and needs to hide this,
she thinks, from Mrs. Gereth. The problem with this thinking however is not only that it
puts Fleda in a false position (her devotion to her honor invariably forces her to lie, most
frequently to Mrs. Gereth), but also that it depends on a false premise, which is that Mrs.
Gereth would be angry if she found out Fleda loved Owen. Mrs. Gereth would be
delighted to learn Fleda loves Owen, which may be what Fleda really fears—afraid that
Mrs. Gereth will make another “vulgar” attempt to fling Fleda into Owen’s arms. On the
other hand she is right in thinking that Mrs. Gereth would be upset to learn that Fleda’s
love for Owen has convinced her of his right to the house, even if it means installing
Mona as its mistress. But if, as I have been arguing, we understand Fleda’s perceptivity
to be at odds with her uncritical devotion to Owen’s honor and property rights we can ask
ourselves whether her perceptivity, added to or aided by her love, might have shown her
that that love was best realized in helping Owen become more appreciative of his
mother’s feelings and his mother more appreciative of Owen’s, which would have
allowed her to avoid take sides.
If we ask ourselves which of James’s narrators comes closest to a thoroughly
responsible perception we would probably say Lambert Strether, though even he fails to
maintain his perception to the very end. One of Strether’s goals throughout The
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Ambassadors is to get everyone involved in the situation with Chad and Madame de
Vionnet to do justice to the opposing viewpoint—most especially to get the Americans to
appreciate the Europeans’ side, since the Europeans already have a fairly indulgent
understanding of the American perspective. For Strether it is not just about seeing things
fairly himself; it is also about trying to get others to see it fairly. In fact, the things he
sees obligate him to try to get others to see them fairly. Chad’s change should matter to
Sarah Newsome, and though capable of doing justice to Sarah’s view of the thing,
Strether also has to plead with her to see the larger view. Something similar happens in
The Spoils of Poynton: as limited as Mrs. Gereth’s imagination is, it does justice to a
view of the spoils that Fleda is forced to acknowledge; the spoils demand a larger view
than Owen and Mona give them, and Mrs. Gereth is right to demand it—although not to
the exclusion of larger views of everything and everyone else. By the same token, Fleda
is justified in accusing Mrs. Gereth of “simplifying way too much…of slashing into [life]
with a great pair of shears—justified in trying to get her to see that “the tangle of life is
much more intricate than you’ve ever, I think, felt it to be” (224). The lives of everyone
involved in the situation with the spoils demand a larger view than the one Mrs. Gereth
gives them.
Neither Strether, nor Mrs. Gereth nor Fleda is wrong in pleading for the larger
view; instead, the view itself creates this obligation—what it is places demands on the
viewers that the viewers ignore to their peril—the peril of not really doing justice to all
life has to offer. Trying to persuade others to see these views—without doing injustice to
their views—becomes a sort of moral obligation. It is an obligation James’s characters
wield very delicately but one whose importance is not to be denied. Those like Fleda or

44

Maggie Verver who attempt to deny it are invariably shown to be choosing a less full life
and to be preventing those around them from living as fully as well. In fact, since James
sees his narrators as like novelists in being “charmed painters or poets,” we can
conjecture that his narrators, like his novels, are intended to persuade those who fall into
their hands of the importance of responsible perception. An individual’s responsibility
to his or her perceptions may include attempting to persuade others of their existence;
therefore, we can infer that doing equal justice to the perspectives of both Owen and Mrs.
Gereth might have included persuading Owen, on the one hand, to see the greatness of
both Mrs. Gereth’s character and the works of art and persuading Mrs. Gereth, on the
other, to appreciate Owen’s simplicity and good nature. If Fleda had done this in her
initial role as ambassador she might have achieved a reconciliation between their
seemingly opposing interests. She might have enabled Owen to see the importance of
preserving Poynton for his mother while encouraging Mrs. Gereth to have been more
appreciative of her son. She might have been more successful in the former task since we
see Owen testifying, through Fleda’s influence—though she consciously tries not to
wield it—to more of an appreciation for art and delicacy as the novel progresses, whereas
Mrs. Gereth proves “inexorable as death” until she loses the spoils, though Fleda actually
promises Owen at one point that “I’ll make [your mother] see it, I’ll make her see it!”
(99). (She does not, of course—she is too scared of revealing her love for Owen to even
try.) Still, had Fleda persuaded only Owen she would have achieved more for each of
them than she actually does.
On the other hand, if we understand responsible perception to include not only the
responsibility of seeing clearly and thoroughly oneself but also (when the occasion allows
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it) the responsibility of persuading others to see clearly and thoroughly, and if we
recognize further that by marrying Owen or by convincing him to preserve the house for
his mother no matter whom he marries, Fleda may be confirming his mother in her
monomania, we may want to argue that Fleda is doing the best thing for Mrs. Gereth by
depriving her of her home and forcing her to confront the limitations of her perspective.
By the end of Spoils Mrs. Gereth has been forced to humanize her outlook—to recognize
beauty in things other than priceless works of art. Perhaps this punishment is equal to
and as equally justified as the one Fleda receives in the end for her own monomaniacal
morality (that is, the burning of Poynton, which destroys all evidence of her imagined
sacrifice). But is Fleda herself justified in making this a reason for her decision not to
marry Owen, that Mrs. Gereth needs to be taught to a lesson? Similarly, would she be
justified in making Mona’s need to learn a lesson a reason for helping Owen out of his
engagement? However inevitable some sort of fall may be for characters who fail to do
justice to viewpoints other than their own, a responsible perceiver is never justified in
bringing it about. The extent to which Fleda may have had Mrs. Gereth’s comeuppance
in mind in refusing to close with Owen—and knowing what we do of Fleda’s psychology
and her latent hatred for Mrs. Gereth this is not an unlikely motivation—may be just the
extent to which the omniscient narrator has Fleda’s own comeuppance in mind in staging
the burning of Poynton. Characters who attempt to “play God” are committing the
cardinal sin of pride. Any attempt to aid others must be made with humility and a
constant sense of one’s own liability to error; it must always take the form of persuasion,
not coercion. If Fleda had faced her situation with a keener sensitivity she would have
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asked herself how she could do justice to the most possible people and perspectives while
employing the least possible force or bias.
Characters in James have a simultaneous responsibility to acknowledge the
limitations of their own perspectives and constantly to attempt to transcend them. An
unfortunate though understandable (and perhaps willful) blindness to her own limitations
ties Fleda to a notion of honor that even contemporary readers found “an over-sensitive
perversity.”13 Had she questioned the motivations behind her fidelity to this ideal she
might have valued it less highly and given other considerations more weight. Her
conviction of the sacredness of engagements (and property rights) might have given way
to awareness that, like most so-called “moral absolutes,” these were political constructs
that served the interests of a patriarchal and hierarchical civilization, constructs that
enforced her marginalization. She might have decided to suspend her reliance on these
notions in favor of more sensitivity to the particular, to her particular self as well as to the
selves and situations of those around her. Had she done this, she might have found that
this alternate morality—this “insistence on the importance of contextual complexity and
particularized judgment in good deliberation”—would have admitted and aided the
ethical value of emotion, including romantic love.14 It would have admitted emotion,
first of all, as an existential fact—one whose existence, characteristics and consequences,
all dependent to some degree on the situation in which they arise, must be thoroughly
understood before they can be judged. Secondly, it would have admitted that certain
emotions—particularly love, whether romantic or platonic—encourage reflexive
awareness by developing an individual’s interest in someone outside herself, an interest
that will (if it is love and not lust) force her to differentiate between her needs and desires
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and those of the loved one. This alternate, particularized morality may also aid love,
especially the kind that is immature or unthinking—the kind often portrayed in literature
as recalcitrant to reflexive morality. People who have cultivated the capacity for
reflection may be less likely to confuse love with lust, for example. Like Fleda, they
recognize the qualities in another person that would make for a compatible relationship;
they are also more likely to give second chances to people whom others have dismissed,
to feel sympathy for people whose experiences are alien from their own. A reflexive
person already, Fleda’s personal involvement with the Gereths—her love for Owen and
her sympathy with Mrs. Gereth—increases her sensitivity, and if she had seen this as
morally valuable, more valuable than an unquestioning loyalty to Owen, she might have
achieved happiness for all of them—for everyone in the drama who stands a chance of
redemption.
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Chapter IV
Love, even of the reflexive kind, does not always achieve its object. If Mona had
been a different person—less vulgar and avaricious, more amenable to suggestion—Fleda
might, if she had set herself to encouraging understanding in everyone, have succeeded in
reconciling Mona and Owen in a way that is conducive to their mutual growth and
happiness. In she had succeeded, she would have had to console herself with the thought
that she had at least been true to herself and her love for Owen, a consolation she is
ultimately denied (though symbolically) at the end of her actions in The Spoils of
Poynton. I want to turn now to two other novels from the experimental period whose
heroines are more genuinely entitled to this consolation when their love fails to attain its
object. James does not always deny his protagonists the consolation of self-knowledge:
in What Maisie Knew and The Awkward Age the respective heroines, young girls, are
disappointed in love, but unlike Fleda their disappointment is caused less by their own
blindness than by the blindness of others—by the inability of their loved ones to free
themselves from either the seductions of lust or the claims of conventional morality. The
loss of such men is consequently, for the reader, less of a matter of regret, because
despite the loss both girls achieve, through their love, a level of discernment that will,
especially in Maisie’s case, stand them in good stead in future relationships.
I want to look briefly at What Maisie Knew to trace the connection between
Maisie’s need to give and receive love and her developing moral sense, which turns out
to be the kind of moral sense characterized by a keen sensitivity to the particular, not the
kind Mrs. Wix, her governess—the representative of “old-fashioned conscience”—vainly
attempts to teach her.1 What is interesting about this larger moral sense is that James
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portrays it as an ordinary psychological development, one that unfolds in and through
Maisie’s natural need for love. Thanks to Western schools of religion and
psychoanalysis, we are used to thinking of morality as something superimposed by
society on our fundamentally bestial and egocentric natures, which may be true of the
kind of morality represented by Mrs. Wix; but in Maisie’s morality passion and
compassion develop concurrently.
If Maisie is to develop any sort of moral sense she will have to do it on her own;
until the advent of Mrs. Wix the field is clear of adults who possess consciences of any
sort. A nurse who protests against Mr. and Mrs. Farange’s habit of conveying insulting
messages to each other through Maisie is fired by the end of the first chapter and Maisie
is left to be reared in a moral vacuum. Mr. and Mrs. Farange are species of James’s rare
irredeemable characters; they are vain, licentious, showy, spiteful monsters who function
mainly to exaggerate the reader’s sense that Maisie is floundering in the dark. Her first
awareness is that the messages she has been passing from parent to parent have been
conveying hatred and insult.2 She has been conveying them “faithfully” with a childish
need to oblige parents who have impressed her with how much trouble she has caused
them (13). When she realizes, without understanding what the messages mean, that her
words do not match her intentions—that she is being made messenger of unhappy and
unpleasant things—she shuts down, taking refuge in watchful silence. For a long stretch
of the story she is occupied in attempting to understand what adults mean when they say
things that do not square with her childish understanding of things, an understanding
driven by her need to be loved and to have everyone love each other. She is attracted to
the people who are nicest to her: she clings to whoever seems to care about her, although
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like any child she is dazzled and drawn by beautiful people, unable as yet to make the
distinction between inward and outward beauty. Her first attachment is to Miss
Overmore, her first governess at her mother’s, whose loveliness—especially when she
holds her fork with her little finger curled out—and apparent liking of her commands
Maisie’s loyalty (18). Miss Overmore is the one who teaches her the pleasure of secrecy,
who demonstrates the sense of power that comes from withholding truth, who gives
Maisie the impression that withholding the truth is one of the ways Maisie can be of use
to those who are taking such fond care of her.
Miss Overmore is partially succeeded by Mrs. Wix, who becomes Maisie’s
governess at her mother’s when Miss Overmore defects to Mr. Farange’s house. Mrs.
Wix is poor and shabby and, as Maisie divines with her childish acuteness, someone who
is “in the eyes of the world a figure mainly to laugh at” (25). In lieu of other
accomplishments Mrs. Wix has cultivated a grand faded morality which she nourishes
with large doses of romantic fiction. Throughout the story represents the convergent
claims (at least in the similarity of their goals, that of tidying up the ugliness of life) of
romance and morality, which provide both her and Maisie with a refuge from the sense—
felt more consciously in Mrs. Wix—of their mutual vulnerability and superfluity in their
exile in the shabby schoolroom at Mrs. Farange’s. It is Mrs. Wix who brings Maisie first
tidings of Sir Claude, breaching the gates of Mr. Farange’s house bearing Sir Claude’s
picture, championing him as the saviour of them both. He will, she implies, looking
triumphantly at Miss Overmore, deliver Maisie from the contamination of her father’s
home and elevate and dignify the position of them both.
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With or without Mrs. Wix’s embroidery, Sir Claude’s beauty, good-nature, and
frankness are as irresistible to Maisie as they are to everyone else. Come to fetch her
from her father’s house, he appears before her as a “shining presence”:
Nothing else that was most beautiful ever belonging to her could kindle
that particular joy—not Mrs. Beale at that very moment, not papa when he
was gay, more mamma when she was dressed, nor Lisette when she was
new. The joy almost overflowed in tears when he laid his hand on her and
drew her to him, telling her, with a smile of which the promise was as
bright as that of a Christmas-tree, that he knew her ever so well by her
mother, but had come to see her now that he might know her for himself
(57).
Sir Claude’s appearance here is associated through Maisie’s mind with the joy of the
advent or perhaps—with his “shining presence”—with the second coming. It is
interesting to compare Sir Claude with Owen Gereth, who has something of the same
effect on Fleda . It may be an effect of his homoeroticism that James makes so much
more of a point of his beautiful men than he makes of his beautiful women. Beauty never
provides a complete explanation for the effect of women like Princess Cassamassima or
Miriam Rooth, whose beauty is either sharpened or qualified by their genius or
artificiality. Sir Claude’s beauty, like Owen’s, goes “all the way down”—it is as
descriptive of his charm and good-nature as it is of his physical appearance. To have
Maisie captivated so instantly is therefore not to attribute to her a superficial infatuation
like her earlier infatuation for Miss Overmore, now so patently superceded. Sir Claude
has a more sincere affection for Maisie, a more sincere desire to do right by her, a more
honest and open temperament, and a more considerate and convivial personality than
anyone else Maisie has known, and these things are apparently visible in his countenance
as he kisses Maisie hello.
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All this is as agreeable to Maisie’s hunger for affection and security as it is to
Mrs. Wix’s, and the two spend most of their time in the schoolroom idolizing Sir Claude.
Mrs. Wix’s romantic infatuation makes perfect sense to Maisie’s childish mind. They
envision themselves as glorious martyrs in Sir Claude’s cause, which appears to be, to
Maisie, an attempt to make everything as pleasant as possible, to smooth out the discord
and disagreement that has characterized her entire existence. To Mrs. Wix and to the
reader his cause is somewhat different: smoothing out the discord is inseparable from
restoring decorum and decency, concepts Maisie does not understand. Sir Claude does
his best to live up to the expectations of both, and the frankness and geniality with which
he generally treats them are what make Maisie suspicious when he asks her to keep a
secret from Mrs. Wix. The secret is (though he does not explain it this way to Maisie)
that he has fallen in love—or fallen into the clutches—of the new Mrs. Beale Farange,
formerly Miss Overmore, and that he hopes with Maisie’s help to reintegrate her into
their lives without making a scandal. Maisie declines to help him sneak Mrs. Beale into
the schoolroom without Mrs. Wix’s knowledge, and his requesting this of her has a very
different effect than did the secret understanding she once shared with Mrs. Beale:
There came to her from this glance at what they might hide the first small
glimpse of something in him that she wouldn’t have expected. There had
been times when she had had to make the best of the impression that she
herself was deceitful; yet she had never concealed anything bigger than a
thought. Of course she now concealed this thought of how strange it
would be to see him hide (85).
The text does not tell us how Maisie has figured out what being deceitful means and how
she seems to know it is bad. Perhaps her mother has accused her of it after failing to
penetrate Maisie’s silences, or perhaps she has heard one of the adults around her charge
it to one of the others. So far she has been resigned to her own deceit, but the difference
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in Sir Claude’s is not just in the size of the thing to be concealed. It is also in its
consequences: she conceals things from her parents because she knows that they dislike
each other and does not want to be made an instrument of their strife, but Sir Claude is
supposed to be “brothers-in-arms” with Mrs. Wix, and to keep something from her would
create strife, not stifle it. She is uneasy about this possibility of discord between two
people who have created such an atmosphere of good will around her, uneasy that Sir
Claude, by suggesting it, is associating himself with disharmony. The time Maisie has
spent at her mother’s has been, thanks to him and his kindness to her and Mrs. Wix, filled
with gaiety and games and more happiness than she has ever known. Maisie is also
uneasy about Sir Claude’s needing to hide something. For her, as for Fleda Vetch,
concealment is a defense mechanism—a defense against fear of personal vulnerability.
Maisie has not “expected” that Sir Claude would be afraid of anything; he has (even in
this talk) been the person who has spoken to her most frankly about things that other
adults have tried to hide. She has never associated him with fear, but the chapter closes
with his admission that Maisie’s mother frightens him a good deal, which is what makes
the deceit necessary.
This episode illuminates the way Maisie’s mind works. She has not been—and
will not be, on several more occasions—adverse to deceit if it saves her from being a
messenger of ill will, but she “cuts [Sir Claude] short” for suggesting they deceive Mrs.
Wix (85). Her morality is “relative”—relative to what would be best for her in each
particular situation. What is best for her, however, is not that her selfish whims be
gratified but that people treat her and each other kindly. On an intuitive level she already
understands that her own well-being is tied to the well-being of those around her. She
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does not, as yet, see herself as separate from her governess and four parents. They are the
architects of her fate. Like Fleda, she is bound both by circumstances and her fear of
making them worse. Also like Fleda, she exercises only passive resistance, choosing
when she has to choose (in a passive sort of way—she never asks Sir Claude for
anything) to attach herself to those who will cause her the least suffering, that is, those
who are most capable of responsible perception, of perceiving her needs and
understanding their responsibility to them. Sir Claude is the best choice because he is
freer to perceive than any of the others (though this is obviously not saying much). Mrs.
Wix’s vision is limited by her morality, which in turn is limited by her fear—a double
blindness, symbolized in the text by the “straighteners” she uses to correct her “divergent
obliquity of vision,” one of the physical defects which along with her poverty are the
source of her fear. The straighteners, she tells Maisie, are “put on for the sake of others,
whom, as she believed, they helped to recognize the bearing, otherwise doubtful, of her
regard” (25). This belief, like her belief in the helpfulness of her prescriptive morality
(“[Sir Claude] leans on me—he leans on me!” she says, hushed and proud, to Maisie), is
offered to the reader with ironic amusement (96). Even Maisie knows that Mrs. Wix is
not to be taken seriously. No beauty is associated with the perspective of conventional
morality in What Maisie Knew, as it is in Spoils and The Awkward Age. Mrs. Wix’s
“greasy greyness,” topped off by her goggles, reminds Maisie of “the polished shell or
corslet of a horrid beetle” (25). Consequently when Maisie’s great trial comes, the time
when—like Fleda—she is forced to take control of her destiny, she is not seduced by the
perspective of conventional morality. She cannot defer to notions of honor and delicacy;
she is forced to recognize her fear as fear—and to choose between love and fear.
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Unlike Fleda, Maisie chooses love, and I want to spend the rest of this discussion
proving, first, that her choice is not—as some have argued—a compromise between
passion and principle, if we understand principle in a conventional way, and secondly
analyzing the content of this choice and how she arrives at it.3 We have shown that Fleda
and many of her readers mistakenly believe her choice to be between passion (or pleasure
or happiness) and principle; many readers, failing to do justice to the ambiguities of the
text, have understood Maisie’s choice in the same way. Certainly this is the way Mrs.
Wix sees it, and after Sir Claude has left them together in Boulogne she strives to get
Maisie to see it that way. She wants Sir Claude to forsake his adulterous relationship
with Mrs. Beale and set up asylum with her and Maisie. Failing to keep him from
returning to England, to the clutches of Mrs. Beale, she turns on Maisie in exasperation
when the latter questions why it would not be possible for the four of them—Sir Claude,
Mrs. Beale, her and Mrs. Wix—to live together in Europe. Maisie has completely
accepted Sir Claude’s argument that Mr. Beale’s desertion gives the current Mrs. Beale
as much freedom as the former Mrs. Beale’s desertion has given Sir Claude. And those
of us with modern eyes—eyes more accustomed to the point of view of modern
morality—can acknowledge Sir Claude’s point along with Maisie. There is difference
between two people living together when their respective spouses have abandoned them
and the same two people living together when their spouses are still committed to their
respective marriages. As readers we can also agree that of the four parents in Maisie’s
life Sir Claude and to a lesser degree Mrs. Beale are certainly the most respectable; their
affair is carried on with some degree of decorum and attention to the feelings of others
(Maisie’s especially, on Sir Claude’s part).
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One of the hallmarks of responsible perceivers is their caution in overstepping the
bounds of general principle. General principles become principles because they serve a
useful purpose; therefore it is always best to have clear and valid reasons for choosing not
to be guided by them. Mrs. Beale’s respect for principle is obviously more superficial
than Sir Claude’s, fueled more by concern for her reputation than concern for anyone
else, though we can excuse this to a certain extent by reminding ourselves (as we
reminded ourselves with Fleda) of her impoverished background and limited alternatives.
But Sir Claude has always attempted to do justice to the best possible rationale for the
principles in question, that of respecting the feelings and rights of others. He has refused
to speak poorly of his wife in front of Maisie, he has done his best to project the sense of
security that their marriage should entitle Maisie to feel, and has refrained from sneaking
Mrs. Beale into the schoolroom when Ida and Mrs. Wix are out, all of which is more than
can be said of Ida herself. Consequently we are inclined to sympathize when he tells
Mrs. Wix that “You’ve judged for me, I know, a good deal…but you can’t do it always;
no one can do that for another, don’t you see, in every case. There are exceptions,
particular cases that turn up and that are awfully delicate” (261). We hear echoes of
Fleda’s accusation of oversimplification, and Maisie and Mrs. Wix are struck by his
“princely” bearing as he says these things.
To Maisie Sir Claude is entirely justified in thinking Mrs. Beale free—not that he
has had to justify himself to her as he attempts to justify himself to Mrs. Wix, since
Maisie has no “moral sense” in the conventional sense of the word. To Maisie her
father’s badness does justify Mrs. Beale’s freedom, and she is not just taking it from Sir
Claude that her father is bad—when Sir Claude tried to hand her Mr. Beale’s

58

“abominable” letter and is intercepted by Mrs. Wix, Maisie tells him “I know what’s in
it!” (255). She knows because she has seen her father and his new mistress, the
Countess. Maisie’s reaction to the Countess is as disturbing as her introduction to Sir
Claude was exciting—disturbing for the reader for its betrayal of James’s unsavory racist
side but disturbing for Maisie because it convinces her that there is something wrong with
her father’s new relationship and—by extension—with her mother’s relationship with the
Captain. Maisie is repulsed by the Countess’s ugliness, which is described in lurid terms.
Yet Maisie’s susceptibility to appearance is rarely a susceptibility to outward beauty
alone; her own parents are described in the introduction as remarkable handsome, but
Maisie reacts to their beauty only when she begins to imagine that it represents some
redeeming inner goodness. As we have seen, her responses to Sir Claude and Miss
Overmore’s beauty are indicative of these individuals’ (comparative) virtue and goodnature. As readers we are also aware that James is using physical appearance to
symbolize what Maisie intuits but is too young to articulate (and James wants to tell as
much of the story as possible from Maisie’s point of view). We can assume, therefore—
without doing injustice to the part of Maisie’s judgment that is typically childish and
superficial—that Maisie’s reaction to the Countess is at least partly caused by an acute
childish intuition into the Countess’s character. More explicit in the text is Maisie’s
awareness that her father cannot possibly love someone who looks like the Countess
(knowing the kind of woman her father has previously preferred) and that if he does not
love her the relationship must be terribly wrong, just as her mother’s situation became
wonderfully right when the Captain assured Maisie he loved her. Another reason for
Maisie’s reaction to the Countess—though it is one that should offend us in this particular
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context—is that physical beauty is a morally relevant feature for her, and not just because
of her youthful immaturity. All of James’s reflective narrators—and these are the
characters who receive James’s greatest moral approval—are sensitive to the relevance of
physical beauty in ethical evaluation. Whether it is Fleda’s appreciation of Owen or
Strether’s appreciation of Madame de Vionnet, there is almost always a sense in James
that beauty is something that must be taken into account when ethical decisions are made.
Thus when Mrs. Wix tries to convince Maisie that Mrs. Beale is a bad person and it
would be a “crime” for her and Sir Claude to live together, Maisie responds, “She’s
beautiful and I love her! I love her and she’s beautiful.” The implication is, as Mrs. Wix
immediately recognizes, that Mrs. Wix is “hideous” and Maisie hates her (276): “As for
my being hideous it’s hardly the first time I’ve been told so! I know it so that even if I
haven’t whiskers—have I?—I dare say there are other ways in which the Countess is a
Venus to me!” (276).
The comparison with the Countess is apt not only because it demonstrates how
much beauty factors into Maisie’s understanding of goodness but also because it
underscores the connection—one that James intends us to make—between the ugliness of
reductive morality and the ugliness of reductive greed and desire. While Mrs. Wix is
attempting to “straighten” Maisie’s vision, Maisie is (naively and perhaps unconsciously)
attempting to straighten hers, by reminding her of the moral relevance of factors other
than who is married to whom. Mrs. Beale’s beauty and charm are morally relevant, as is
Maisie’s love for her. For Maisie, love is an important factor in ethical decisions: her
love for Mrs. Beale, Mrs. Beale’s love for her, Mrs. Beale’s love for Sir Claude, Sir
Claude’s love for Maisie and Mrs. Wix, and their love for him. When Mrs. Wix insists
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that Maisie wants to be rid of Mrs. Beale just as much as she does, Maisie recognizes the
truth of this statement—she does want Sir Claude to be exclusively theirs—but it makes
her feel ashamed, not because Mrs. Wix has uncovered a moral sense she is trying to
pretend she does not possess but because she feels that she is “being precisely accused of
the meanness that had brought everything down on her through her very desire to shake
herself clear of it” (275). “I never, never hoped I wasn’t going again to see Mrs Beale!”
she says passionately to Mrs. Wix, “I didn’t , I didn’t, I didn’t!” Maisie has been trying
to avoid meanness her whole life, and to be mean is the worst crime in her mind. To
love—to be loyal—is the greatest good, and Mrs. Wix has better luck in her attempts to
instill a moral sense in Maisie when she appeals to Maisie’s love for Sir Claude the next
afternoon.
By the next day Mrs. Wix has been trying to give Maisie a moral sense for
twenty-four hours, with dubious success. It is obvious from what the text records of
Maisie’s speech and thought processes and Mrs. Wix’s exasperated responses that she is
unable to comprehend (to the reader’s ironic amusement) why Sir Claude and Mrs.
Beale’s living together would be a crime. Up to the last their arguments bounce off each
other’s impenetrable minds:
‘Is it a crime?’ Maisie then asked.
Mrs. Wix was as prompt as if she had been crouching in a lair. ‘Branded
by the Bible.’
‘Well, he won’t commit a crime.’
Mrs. Wix looked at her gloomily. ‘He’s committing one now.’
‘Now?’
‘In being with her.’
Maisie had it on her tongue’s end to return once more: ‘But now he’s
free.’ She remembered, however, in time, that one of the things she had
known for the last entire hour was that this made no difference. After that,
and if to turn the right way, she was on the point of a blind dash, a weak
reversion to the reminder that it might make a difference, might diminish
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the crime for Mrs. Beale; till such a reflexion was in its order also quashed
by the visibility in Mrs. Wix’s face of the collapse produced by her
inference from her pupil’s manner that after all her pains her pupil didn’t
even yet adequately understand (285).
When no letter comes from Sir Claude that morning Mrs. Wix changes tactics.
Announcing that Sir Claude is obviously afraid of Mrs. Beale she abruptly asks Maisie,
after a pause, whether it has occurred to her to be jealous of Mrs. Beale. Maisie sees in
this question an opportunity to prove her moral sense beyond a doubt. Up to this point
she has been keenly aware—if she understands nothing else—that Mrs. Wix considers
her “superficial” for not seeming to understand what a moral sense is. She now sees a
way to prove that she is taking the situation as seriously as she should. Acknowledging
that it has occurred to her to be jealous of Mrs, Beale, she then “throw[s] out in regard to
Mrs. Beale such a remark as she had never dreamed she would live to make. ‘If I thought
she was unkind to him—I don’t know what I should do...Well I can think of one
thing…I’d kill her” (289). Mrs. Wix’s response to this is immediate and unqualified: she
starts weeping so heavily that “the straighteners [are] all blurred with tears which after a
little seemed to have sprung from [Maisie’s] own eyes. There were tears in fact on both
sides of the spectacles, and they were even so thick that it was presently all Maisie could
do to make out through them that slowly, finally, Mrs. Wix put forth a hand” (288). The
two sit holding hands until they hear the dinner bell ring, each convinced that Maisie has
finally understood the moral point of view.
At least Maisie is convinced that she has; but what Mrs. Wix has done (if we want
to read her as completely manipulative) is play a rather a nasty trick on Maisie.
Despairing of giving Maisie a moral sense, Mrs. Wix has decided to enlist her against
Mrs. Beale by appealing to her affection for Sir Claude—the least noble side of her
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affection, the side Maisie has been doing her best to suppress. Goaded, Maisie admits
that “it has occurred to her” to be jealous of Mrs. Beale and that if Mrs. Beale ever hurt
Sir Claude she would be capable of killing her. Having admitted this and received Mrs.
Wix’s emotional approval Maisie believes that she finally understands and has convinced
Mrs. Wix that she understands the moral point of view (it is still very important for
Maisie to please everyone at this point). But if we were to ask Maisie, as she is sitting on
the bench holding Mrs. Wix’s hand, what the moral point of view is she would probably
say, “Thou shalt be willing to do anything (including evil) for love.” We know—and
Mrs Wix knows—that this is not the moral point of view understood in the traditional
sense. The traditional moral view, branded in the Bible, is “Thou shalt not commit
adultery” (285). Whether Mrs. Wix is deliberately deceiving Maisie or has confused her
own moral sense with her passion for Sir Claude is difficult to say—knowing both James
and Mrs. Wix it is probably a bit of both. The tears fogging the straighteners and
Mrs.Wix’s pitiful adoration for Sir Claude support the latter interpretation, the way she
pushes Maisie into this painful admission supports the former. At any rate, Mrs. Wix
reminds us of how easily moral motivations can be confused with (or used to disguise)
primitive passions—both are unthinking absolute allegiances.
When Mrs. Beale arrives in Boulogne and attempts to persuade Mrs. Wix and
Maisie to stay abroad with her and Sir Claude it becomes obvious (to both them and the
reader) that Maisie and Mrs. Wix are not in as much accord as they thought they were. It
becomes obvious that what became clear to Maisie on the hill is that she loves Sir Claude
best, that her allegiance is to him, and that Mrs. Beale is not good for him—the latter of
which makes us realize that Maisie’s love is more mature, less about jealousy and more
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about concern for Sir Claude’s well-being than we might have realized from the scene on
the hill. As they are talking at bedtime after their day with Mrs. Beale it becomes
apparent that Maisie’s love for Sir Claude is more mature than Mrs. Wix is capable of
realizing. When Mrs. Wix asks her whether she intends to “kill” Mrs. Beale, Maisie does
not answer, persisting in asking instead whether Mrs. Wix has decided to accept Mrs.
Beale in Sir Claude’s place. Poor Mrs. Wix is obviously in a hard place, caught by her
own inconsistency. She can hardly say she wants Sir Claude to come now that Mrs.
Beale is there and still retain her moral integrity, but on the other hand she cannot say she
prefers Mrs. Beale and retain Maisie’s allegiance. So what she does is “hedge” and loses
Maisie’s allegiance anyway. From Maisie’s perspective Mrs. Wix is backing away from
their solidarity on the hill, their solidarity in their intense love for Sir Claude. She has
never understood Mrs. Wix’s moral qualms so now all she understands is that Mrs. Wix
loves Sir Claude less than she herself does and in fact loves him so little that she is
thinking about sacrificing him for Mrs. Beale because Mrs. Beale has “fawned” on her
for a day. We already know that Mrs. Wix is pitifully susceptible to flattery—that her
moral sense is less likely to be dimmed by giving genuine love than by receiving a little
appreciation herself—and given her background and appearance we may (and should)
wince at the harshness with which Maisie has sacrificed her before they go to bed. As
poor as Maisie herself is bound to be, she has not yet experienced destitution and can
perhaps afford to be more loyal and idealistic than Mrs. Wix. On the other hand, Mrs.
Wix is the one who has forced Maisie into this take-no-prisoners position and is probably
not entitled to groan if she is the first to suffer from it.

64

This bedroom scene makes it clear that whatever either of them thought, Maisie
has not developed a moral sense in any traditional sense of the word. We have seen a
little of what she has developed and how she has developed it, but I want to look more
closely at this development as it comes into full bloom in the railway station with Sir
Claude. One of the things we have to keep in mind in describing Maisie’s perspective is
that it is not static; it is constantly maturing—growing in leaps and bounds in the last
days at Boulogne—so that what she feels and understands at each point is usually
modified by subsequent impressions, as we have just seen in the difference between the
her feelings on the rampart and her feelings in her bedroom later that same evening.4
Thus the best place to say anything about her with certainty is at the end of the novel
when she makes her decision and all that is left is for Sir Claude to admire it and make
his. First of all we have to acknowledge that for Maisie to make any decision at all is
impressive; for the past twelve or thirteen years she has been—like Fleda—almost
completely passive, taking in a ton of impressions but acting on very few of them, and
always acting on the ones that will make things most pleasant for her. Since she is a
child with an unusual amount to take in, there is more excuse for her passivity than there
is for Fleda’s and for Maggie Verver’s in The Golden Bowl. She certainly has to make
her big choice with far less knowledge than they have. Unlike Fleda she does not even
understand all the levels on which her choice reverberates; she has no understanding of
the “moral sense” of the situation and perhaps as little understanding of the sexual
activity the moral sense is meant to condemn, although as I mentioned earlier this
probably makes her choice easier in some respects than either Fleda’s or Mrs. Wix’s.
Certainly she does not have to worry about public opinion and has yet to experience the
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evils of indigence and social ostracism. And if that makes her decision clearer for her it
also makes it clearer for us, in not having to wonder (as we did with Fleda) what it would
have been had her vision not been weakened by these things. For her the difficulty of the
decision is ultimately in making it, in having to own responsibility for what will happen
because of her actions, as she has been afraid to do in the past for fear of doing the wrong
thing.
The decision for which she has to take responsibility is whether she will stay with
Mrs. Beale and Sir Claude together and sacrifice Mrs. Wix or leave them and go home—
which is nowhere—with Mrs. Wix, who is “nobody” (309). If she stays with Sir Claude
and Mrs. Beale she will be helping facilitate a relationship that makes Sir Claude
unhappy, weak, deceitful and afraid but if she does not go with them she will be
sacrificing her own happiness. This may seem at first glance to be the same decision
Mrs. Wix is struggling over, but the difference is that Maisie’s objection to the first
alternative has nothing to do with its being a crime “branded by the Bible.” As we have
seen in the previous evening’s discussion with Mrs. Wix, her objection is solely on the
grounds that Sir Claude is “afraid” of Mrs. Beale—that Mrs. Beale “hasn’t even been
kind to him” (309). However self-serving her dislike of Mrs. Beale may have seemed
when Mrs. Wix first appealed to it, as soon as Sir Claude returns to Boulogne Maisie
perceives the level of uneasiness his liaison with Mrs. Beale is genuinely causing him.
Awakened to Mrs. Wix’s announcing “my poor dear, he has come,” Maisie rushes into
the salon and is disconcerted when Sir Claude stops short and “for a longer minute than
had ever at such a junction elapsed,” does not open his arms for an embrace (318). The
pause that ensues enables Maisie to look around and realize that the salon is no longer his
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and hers—it is now his and Mrs. Beale’s and he is standing apart from her, greeting her
“across a gulf” (318-9). The text records that “in a flash she saw he was different—more
so than he knew or designed” (319). It is obvious to the reader that he has spent the night
with Mrs. Beale, but when Maisie asks him if he has seen her he gives a bold-faced lie,
and for the first time in their relationship Maisie receives the “faintest purest coldest
conviction that he wasn’t telling the truth” (320). He is extremely uncomfortable with
the whole situation, and his discomfort is increased with each slip in his story—when he
has to leave without his stick because he has left it in the bedroom with Mrs. Beale, when
the waiter asks him what should be sent up for breakfast “for Madame” (323).
When they sit down together at the café Maisie becomes aware of something even
more disconcerting, that he is more nervous than she has ever seen him. “Little by little”
this gives her “a settled terror, a terror that partook of the coldness she had felt just
before, at the hotel, to find herself, on his answer about Mrs. Beale, disbelieve him”
(326). She begins to realize the depth of his fear and it “[begins] to come to her now that
there was one thing just such a man above all could be afraid of. He could be afraid of
himself” (326). She does not even then understand the depth or the real cause of his fear
but when he explains what he wants of her, the terror deepens as she realizes how much
depends on her and how much more difficult her decision has become over the last few
hours. As she recognizes as they get up to walk around and think it over, the safety that
she had expected to feel once Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale were “free” to live together and
love her has completely dissipated, and “the new medium [is] somehow more oppressive
than the old” (341).
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What she has not anticipated but we as readers have with our adult knowledge of
the real natures of both Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale is that even with moral quibbles out of
the way the situation is a recipe for disaster. A flighty woman who is using a little girl to
keep hold of a man whom she knows does not really love her and a man who is bound to
this woman by his obligations to this little girl is not a recipe for a “safe” situation, nor is
the possibility that Maisie’s father has already mentioned, that Sir Claude and Mrs. Beale
will eventually grow bold enough not to need Maisie to cover for them and then she will
become an annoying obligation. What Maisie has sensed is that this is already
happening—that now that Ida and Mr. Beale have set their spouses “free” Sir Claude no
longer feels the need to keep up appearances, of which Maisie has been a part. We can
almost pity the poor butterfly in being saddled with a prepubescent child at the very
moment he is being freed from any need to maintain a heroic and virtuous posture. Ida is
certainly an admirably clever devil. The dullness of Sir Claude’s appreciation of his own
liberation at Folkstone where Ida comes to see them off is a sign to the reader, if not to
Maisie, that he realizes that his heroic gesture has played right into Ida’s hands, giving
her a chance to rid herself of Maisie with a great show of virtue for the sacrifice. Though
still necessary to Mrs. Beale as a shield against public opinion (though several characters
have predicted that this will not last long either), Maisie is now an impediment to Sir
Claude’s freedom—if by his freedom we mean his freedom to sleep in the same bed with
Mrs. Beale without having to lie about it to a little girl the next morning. But what
Maisie realizes during their scene by the tracks is that there is a better freedom to be
had—a freedom from fear and weakness, from being a slave to either passion or
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convention. This is the freedom from needing something to hide behind, from being
unable to look life in the face and make choices for oneself.
In those last few hours in Boulogne Maisie’s love for Sir Claude develops from an
immature passion born out of weakness and need to a genuine love characterized by
responsibility to the best in both him and her. Instead of choosing between the two
alternatives he offers she suggests a third—that the two of them leave Mrs. Wix and Mrs.
Beale and go off to Paris together. In doing so they would be escaping the bonds of both
conventional morality (Mrs. Wix) and soulless lust (Mrs. Beale), neither of which allows
for the possibility of love that sees beyond the limitations of the rote or the immediate.
Maisie has indulged in a childish love that romanticizes Sir Claude to keep up the illusion
of safety and salvation until she is forced (by circumstances her own immaturity has
created!) to face the truth about Sir Claude and the entire situation—or at least enough of
the truth to be able to make an informed decision about it. She has to really see
everything, or as much as she can see with her childish mind. To do her justice she really
has been trying to see throughout the length of the novel. The limitations on her
perspective have usually been imposed from outside, from Mrs. Wix’s idealizations and
the cover-ups and effusions of Mrs. Beale and the others. What little self-deceit she has
practiced has been for the same reason Fleda Vetch practices hers—in defense against the
horrors of her personal situation. As I have already mentioned, the self-deceit seems
more defensible in Maisie’s case because she is still a child and can be called a victim
more justifiably than Fleda. But when Maisie is finally forced to make a decision she
makes what Sir Claude (who has enough integrity to see the beauty of her decision yet
too little to make one of his own) calls the “only right one,” the one that does most justice
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to the potential in everyone. As we have seen from examining Spoils, in James the right
decision is not the one the one that allows every perspective equal importance, but the
one in which an individual grants every perspective equal consideration and then chooses
among them. The right decision is the one that allows experience to inform morality not
morality to inform and limit experience, and once everything is experienced chooses the
perspective that will do most justice to the best in everyone. In Maisie, who is still a
child, the “everyone” is limited to her and Sir Claude, but we will see in The Awkward
Age that as an individual grows, the “everyone” becomes more and more inclusive, and
we can certainly imagine Maisie’s sympathy growing stronger now that she is getting
older and going out into the world.
The “best” perspective in James’s world seems to be the one in which each
individual is encouraged to work through his or her prejudices and misconceptions in
order to see people and things clearly and to help them become responsible and,
hopefully, loving perceivers themselves. This is precisely what Maisie does and what
she is trying to do throughout the novel, with ever increasing success. In this effort to see
everything clearly she is aided by her natural capacity for love, one that we have to say
must be unusually strong if it has survived a childhood like hers so intact. Perhaps the
least realistic part of the novel is the purity of her emotions and instincts. We often
expect an abused child to replicate the selfishness and meanness that characterizes her
parents. Yet James is very explicit in the preface to Maisie about representing a girl
because “the sensibility of the female young is indubitably, for early youth, the greater,”
adding that “my plan would call, on the part of my protagonist, for ‘no end’ of
sensibility” (viii). To imagine a child who has reacted to neglect by becoming more and
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more docile and clingy is certainly not impossible. To imagine anyone with as much
sensibility as most of James’s “centers of consciousness” possess is more of a stretch, but
it is clear from the story that James intends for Maisie to be one of the purest centers of
consciousness he ever portrayed, one who has not been compromised or corrupted as
most of the others (even Strether) have. James describes Maisie as full of “active,
contributive close-circling wonder…in which [her] identity is guarded and preserved, and
which makes her case remarkable exactly by the weight of the tax on it” (xiv). The tax is
the sheer number of vulgar and tawdry impressions out of which she must construct her
finely-tuned consciousness, and we can say that of all James’s tales this is the one that
mostly closely resembles a story of good versus evil, of a heroine of extraordinary virtue
facing and defeating her foes. The foes in this story are the twin foes of blind, selfish
passion (characterized by all four parents) and equally blind, self-serving morality
(characterized by Mrs. Wix), and the heroine must avoid both if she is to defend and
increase her virtue, which is that “vivacity of intelligence by which she indeed does
vibrate in the infected air” (xiv). She avoids both successfully—resisting the impulse to
“see Mrs. Wix” before she makes her decision—and chooses the alternative that
guarantees her clarity of vision, aided by her love for Sir Claude.
Maisie has not chosen between pleasure and principle; she has chosen a higher
alternative to both—love and “wonder,” another of James’s names for imagination or
responsible perception. With the possible minor exception of Sir Claude (and perhaps the
Captain?) she is the only character in the novel who is both imaginative and loving. Her
imagination helps her realize that she is the only one of the whole group who really loves
Sir Claude. Conversely her love helps her see what would be best for him. There is a
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wonderful correlation in the novel between Maisie’s developing affections and her
developing understanding. Unlike Fleda and most of James’s other characters, she does
not have a lifetime of insensibility or deeply engrained prejudices to counteract. In the
beginning she does not even have language; she is “a mite of a half-scared infant in a
great dim theatre,” bombarded by an array of impressions that she must begin to sort out
and name (9). Her emotions are equally inarticulate and in need of sorting out, and their
development follows that of her limited understanding. In the beginning she loves Miss
Overmore because Miss Overmore is pretty, because Miss Overmore seems to like her,
and because Miss Overmore is “saving” her from some unknown fate (18). She takes
each person at face value, loving them because they have the appearance of loving her,
loving the ones that are attractive more than the ones that are not. As her understanding
increases, however—as she is exposed to individuals whose appeal lies less on the
surface—her affections also deepen; and they finally settle on Sir Claude because he is
the individual out of all the others who resonates the most for her imagination. As her
understanding deepens her love for him deepens; as we have seen, the crucial events of
the last three days in Boulogne are her successive realizations that she loves Sir Claude
more than either Mrs. Wix or Mrs. Beale, loves him more because her appreciation of
him is less clouded by a personal agenda than theirs is. Whether her love informs her
understanding or her understanding increases her love in those last few hours is difficult
to say. What seems to happen on the hill is that after drifting along the current of her
impressions and emotions for most of her life—squeezing herself into a little corner and
keeping her eyes open, taking everything in—she is forced to begin defining her position,
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and not knowing everything there is to know about the situation, she takes a stand on
what she does know: she loves Sir Claude.
If we tried to plot her development along a sort of existential timeline, it would go
something like this: for the majority of her youth she has been receiving impressions,
forming conclusions, receiving new impressions and modifying her conclusions in light
of these, her emotions more or less at the mercy of her impressions. Thankfully she is
very impressionable, so her emotions deepen along with her insight. At a certain point
however she is forced to act on these impressions, even though they seem to her to be
incomplete. As we have already recognized, there are situations in which impressions
can legitimately be said to be incomplete, when falling back on Mrs. Wix may be the
wisest option. In this situation however both Mrs. Wix and Sir Claude seem to feel that
Maisie has enough information to be able to make up her mind; and at this point Maisie is
forced to “claim” her impressions, to wrest them into being. In claiming her love for Sir
Claude, which is what her impressions amount to, the chain of cause and effect is
reversed: instead of her reflections informing her emotion, her emotion begins to inspire
reflection. Her commitment to Sir Claude heightens her awareness of who he is and how
she can help him as well as who she is, what her affections are and what others’
affections are not. She is beginning to sense the limits of Mrs. Wix’s emotion even as
they join hands on the rampart, and instead of replying, “So do I” when Mrs. Wix says, “I
adore him. I adore him,” she stops herself and says instead, “Oh, I know!” (289).
Without belaboring the point we can see that Maisie realizes most of what Fleda
might have realized had she not lost her nerve and taken refuge in her honor. What I
want to highlight in this reading however is the connection between love and perception.
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Maisie’s capacity for perception is indispensable to the development of her capacity for
love; without her immense sensibility she may never have ever experienced anything
more than the selfish passion her mother and Mrs. Beale experience. Her ability to see
“shades” in Sir Claude—and although we have been using the metaphor of vision in
imitation of James we know that his “seeing” is as much about sensing or feeling as it is
about literally seeing—makes her attachment stronger and deeper than the other
characters’ attachments. Recognizing the connection between perceptivity and depth of
feeling should be easy for most of us, since in life we usually associate “sensitivity”—
meaning roughly what we have been calling responsible perception, that is the ability to
feel and appreciate more than most people, not just aesthetically but also existentially—
with a greater capacity for appreciation of and attachment to others. In real life the
connection between sensitivity and a deep attachment to others is usually not as strong as
we could wish, since more often than not the sensitive person becomes so overwhelmed
by the burden of that sensitivity that he or she retreats into seclusion and loves and broods
from a distance, or else like Fleda retreats into a protective fatalism. The irony of
extraordinary sensitivity is that it often robs an individual of the ability to act even as her
complex perceptions make her more qualified than most people to make correct choices,
and this is the dilemma with which most of James’s perceivers’ wrestle. Many of James
most notable narrators—Strether, Fleda, Maggie Verver—fail to completely overcome
their immobility, but Maisie is perhaps the most notable among a smaller selection of
characters from the shorter works who do succeed.
Published in volume ten of the New York edition along with The Spoils of
Poynton is a charming short piece called “The Chaperon,” told from the perspective of a
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lovely young woman, appropriately named Rose, who upon coming of age relinquishes
her inheritance and her place in society to take up residence with her mother, who was
banned from society several decades before the story opens for leaving her husband for
another man. Rose has both the imagination to do justice to her mother’s charm and
innocence—superficial as both these qualities may have seemed to a more cynical
observer—and the courage, born of love, to attempt to reintroduce her into society. Not
only does she succeed, she also manages to convince her noble but uptight suitor of the
importance of cultivating open-mindedness, and everyone wins in the end.
Unfortunately, Sir Claude is no Captain Jay, but I think Maisie wins as much as Rose in
the sense of having the courage to act on her imagination and claim her freedom thereby.
And like Rose she is inspired to act by love.
In James’s pantheon there are few if any characters who are portrayed as winning
their freedom or their lovers or both without acting from love, and more often, as I have
been arguing, they lose their freedom or lovers by not acting from love. Love of some
sort is usually the only motivation that keeps characters from acting wrongly. Acting
wrongly means acting in either ignorance of or disregard for alternative perspectives,
although the former is less of a sin than the latter. As we have seen, there is no such
thing as an action that does justice to every possible perspective on a person or situation;
actions have to be performed in spite of the impossibility of complete closure. Therefore
the difference between a good action and a bad one becomes the difference in approach:
is the decision being made with an attitude of humility and an awareness of the
possibility of error? Has the person making it surrendered his personal agenda to the
primacy of the appearance of the other? Perhaps the reason love is so conducive to clear-
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sightedness is that it too demands surrender to the other; an action performed with and
through love is already other-directed. To act out of love as Maisie does is to act with a
constant sensitivity to the feelings and needs of the person loved, and once Maisie (as she
sits on the rampart with Mrs. Wix) has recognized and claimed her love for Sir Claude
she is better capable of recognizing and responding to the deep fear that is driving him.
A number of existentialists (Kierkegaard and Heidegger come immediately to
mind) have shown us the paradoxical connection between surrender and self-affirmation,
and we see it illustrated here in Maisie. The moment of her surrender to her love for Sir
Claude is also the moment in which she finally defines herself as a person—learns to say
“I” as one of E.M. Forster’s characters puts it. As we have already seen with Fleda,
surrendering to others is an act of courage, one that requires facing oneself first,
especially one’s fears and, specifically in James, the awareness that one will never be
able to achieve the kind of stable identity that frees one from vulnerability to others; and
then finding the strength to embrace that indeterminateness. Oftentimes that strength
comes from love, as it does for Maisie. To commit to loving another is to commit to
taking oneself and one’s obligations to at least one other person seriously. When an
individual has really done this, as Maisie has, he or she is more likely to be sensitive to
the needs of other people. This does not happen to Maisie—in fact almost the opposite
happens—but we would not be amiss in imagining it will happen as Maisie grows and
matures.
The immediate effect, for everyone else, of Maisie’s claiming herself and her love
for Sir Claude is that she turns her back on them. She dismisses Mrs. Wix as a “nobody”
and declares herself willing to “kill” Mrs. Beale. “She hates you,” Sir Claude says to
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Mrs. Beale when that lady is offended to learn that Maisie has been trying to get rid of
her, and without assuming that Sir Claude speaks for Maisie (though we would probably
not be wrong to assume it) the text records that Maisie looks at Mrs. Beale with “new
eyes” when the latter asks her “Do you hate me, dearest?” and answers “Will you give
him up?” (361). The inference is that Maisie does hate her, or will hate her if she
continues to manipulate Sir Claude. One way we could defend Maisie—since I have
been arguing that a reflexive person should be able to reconcile their love for one person
with their obligations to everyone else—is to argue that, since this a morality tale, Mrs.
Wix and Mrs. Beale are both specimen of a rare type in James, the thoroughly evil and
completely irredeemable character. Since the good characters in James are the ones who
practice responsible perception, hopefully augmented by larger acts of altruism and some
form of loving emotion, it would make sense that the bad characters would be those
incapable of seeing beyond or acting on anything other than their fears and/or lusts. Mrs.
Beale certainly fits that bill and, to a lesser sense, so does Mrs. Wix. We could also argue
that Mona in The Spoils of Poynton does as well. However, I am uncomfortable
attributing that kind of dismissal to James himself. As I argued at the beginning of the
previous section, James instincts are almost always towards recuperation, not damnation.
What seems more likely is that Maisie’s love is not as pure as it could be; there are still
elements of immaturity in it. For a child who has just declared her first allegiance to be
temporarily blinkered by it is not surprising, though it serves to remind us that even love
of a higher and nobler sort can blind us if we are not careful to remind ourselves that love
is higher and nobler only because it has been chastened and refined by reflection, and that
reflection is still needed to continue the process. A needed refinement in Maisie’s case
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may be a more thorough awareness of Sir Claude’s culpability in the whole situation. A
needed chastening may be a reminder that Sir Claude’s perspective is not the only one
that matters, that others have points of view that also need to be acknowledged.
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Chapter V
Unlike Maisie, the protagonist of The Awkward Age, an eighteen year-old girl,
balances her love for one person with her love and concern for others. It may be a
mistake to call Nanda its protagonist, since The Awkward Age is not written from the
perspective of one character but from the perspective of an omniscient narrator who
presents ten characters in turn, each the focus of one of the novel’s ten books, but she and
her mother are the novel’s dramatic center; they provide the essential conflict and
epitomize the dilemma characteristic of “the awkward age.” The story opens with the
return to society of a noble old gentleman named Mr. Longdon who has just paid a visit
to Nanda’s mother, Mrs. Brookenham, herself the daughter of a long-dead but
respectfully remembered (at least by Mr. Longdon) Lady Julia, for whom the first book is
named. Mr. Longdon was once in love with Lady Julia and treasures her memory as that
of the most perfect woman he every beheld, one who “had everything” as he expresses it
in book one.1 Chief among her charms was her high moral sense—not Mrs. Wix’
pathetic kind but the kind Fleda believes herself to be emulating in Spoils, one that has a
great deal of beauty and delicacy and appeals to both Nanda and Van (the young man
with whom she is in love) as it is illumined in and by Mr. Longdon. For these two young
people, for Mr. Longdon, and for everyone else involved in the story except several
individuals (among them Nanda’s brother) who are too modern to have any doubts about
it, the return of Mr. Longdon and the memory of Lady Julia becomes the occasion for
choosing whether to return to some form of allegiance to the old way or to remain in the
train of Mrs. Brookenham, who represents an emerging modern culture of a particularly
decadent artistic sort, one in which everything is out in the open and up for appreciation
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on an aesthetic level only. Mrs. Brook has a great deal of imagination but no sense of
responsibility; Lady Julia had “not a grain” of imagination but a strong sense of
responsibility, at least to a certain ideal of womanhood; and by the end of the novel
Nanda will emerge as the one who embodies the best of each—not, as Vanderbank might
have wanted, by aping some version of the innocence and ignorance of Lady Julia but by
exercising the imagination she has inherited from her mother with a greater sense of
responsibility than her mother does. Nanda’s only flaw is her nostalgia for Mr.
Longdon’s old morality, and her consequent inability to do herself complete justice. She
knows herself thoroughly—knows “everything” as she and Mitchy and Van all agree—
but thinks herself inferior to the type of girl she believes little Aggie to be, one who
“knows nothing” (355-6, 377-8). She is still caught up by the Victorian idea that young
unmarried girls should know nothing about sex (“Ah say what you will,” she says to
Mitchy, “it is the way we ought to be) or even about the types of immorality—adultery
most especially in this novel—associated with sex, so much so that she falls in love with
a Van who is even more caught up with it than she is and who therefore cannot bring
himself to marry her. Van is the male version of Fleda Vetch. He has been one of the
leading figures in Mrs. Brook’s salon, so much so that, as Nanda reminds him, he told her
as a little girl that she “must take in things at [her] pores. (Nanda hastens to assure the
discomfited Van that this was an observation not a command, but the text plays with the
possibility that it could have been, or that Nanda might have taken it as, a command, and
that Van is therefore partly responsible for the result that he deplores.) Unfortunately he
develops a rather cowardly sense of delicacy when Mr. Longdon announces he will make
Nanda his heir if Van will marry her. Van chooses not to marry her, though Nanda tries
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to make it easier for him by instructing another of her lovers, a rich and worthy young
man named Mitchy, to marry someone else, so that Van will not feel any compunction
about robbing Nanda of Mitchy’s fortune if he does decide to marry her. Despite this
maneuver Van still does not marry her and incurs the wrath of Mr. Longdon, who has by
the end of the novel proved himself superior to Van by learning to love Nanda despite her
difference to Lady Julia (and thereby showing some affinity with James’s later creation
Lambert Strether). The Awkward Age is one of James’s most exquisite novels in terms of
style, theme, and character portrayal and nowhere is it lovelier than in its last several
pages, as Nanda acknowledges that Van has rejected her because she “knows too much”
(543). She asks Mr. Longdon why, if her knowledge matters so much to Van, it seems to
matter so little to him, who has been the representative of old-fashioned “delicacy” all
along:
‘…you know,’ the girl pursued, ‘I am like that.’
‘Like what?’
‘Like what he [Van] thinks.’ Then so gravely that it was almost a
supplication, ‘Don’t tell me that you don’t know what he thinks. You do
know.”
Their eyes, on that strange ground, could meet at last, and the effect of it
was presently for Mr. Longdon. “I do know.”
‘Well?’
‘Well!’ He raised his hands and took her face, which he drew so close to
his own that, as he gently let him, he could kiss her with solemnity on the
forehead. ‘Come!’ he then firmly said—quite indeed as if it were a
question of their moving on the spot (543).
A few lines later Mr. Longdon remarks that Van is “much more” old-fashioned than he
is, the latter having learned that there is something to be valued higher than “delicacy”—
that something being love. This is one of the rare examples in James of two characters of
more or less equal perceptivity coming together and realizing a loving union, one that is
consecrated here by Mr. Longdon’s Christ-like words (“Come”) and gestures and
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Nanda’s “supplicating” posture. Certainly Mr. Longdon has “bought” Nanda in
something of the same sense as Christ “bought” the church: Mr. Longdon has sacrificed
the sanctity of his home in Suffolk to come into society to “save” her. Without probing
all the implications of this religious imagery we can at least recall both Maisie’s
immature idealization of Sir Claude as a Christ-figure and Fleda’s Christ-like (at least in
her own estimation) sacrifice for Owen Gereth in Spoils and remind ourselves that
religious imagery and attitudes in James are usually associated with a kind of death-inlife antithetical to the exercise of the moral imagination. Mr. Longdon is after all taking
her off to a house that has been repeatedly associated with both “peace” and “death,” one
in which Nanda has already spent three weeks that have been “the happiest she had yet
spent anywhere” (224, 333, 351). What exactly are we to make of Nanda then? Does her
affection for old-fashioned morality as embodied in Van lose her the privilege of
exercising her intelligence out in the world with a wiser and more knowledgeable partner
like Mitchy? Is the reader supposed to understand her retreat with Mr. Longdon as a
punishment for her adherence to Van and her disastrous rejection of Mitchy (disastrous at
least in its results for both Mitchy and little Aggie, the woman Mitchy marries)? Or is the
novel attempting to draw attention, as Maisie does, to the tragic plight of those rare
individuals who manage to transcend ordinary human limitations, which is their
inevitable alienation from the representatives of both conventional morality and
irresponsible imagination?
With James we should probably assume that all of these things are going on. If
for a moment we raise the question of intentionality and ask if there is a conflict between
what the text is saying and what James intended I can reiterate what I said at the

82

beginning, that James crafts ambiguity into his novels to provoke these kinds of
investigations, with the aim of encouraging the reader’s imagination. As I have already
acknowledged, there seems to be evidence that at least in The Spoils of Poynton James
was not quite aware of his intentions—that the ambiguity may not have been as deliberate
as it obviously is in subsequent works, though it certainly is still there, James’s skill in
delineating the complexity of his characters’ motivations perhaps causing him to outstrip
his formal intentions. We can also admit that an affection for old-fashioned delicacy
seems to linger even in the novels bent on exposing the limitations of this delicacy, and
that this affection may reflect the soul of their notoriously fastidious late-Victorian
author. On a purely textual level, however, Nanda’s retreat could be explained as part of
the novel’s realism. Very few of the characters in the late Victorian society James’
portrays in this novel as well as many others have the ability simultaneously to sustain
deep love and deep knowledge, and those that do are forced to the edge of society or
forced, if they are able to stay in it, to bestow their affections on people who may not be
worthy of them. Most choose to align themselves with the moral side when that and the
decadent side are the only options; and for Nanda to find Vanderburk more substantive
than the rest of her mother’s coterie is extremely plausible given the circumstances in
which she finds herself.
I think all these things are motivating Nanda, but I also think this text is less
ambiguous than either Spoils or Maisie about its heroine’s motivations, perhaps because
it is not told primarily from Nanda’s point of view. From the very beginning Nanda is
portrayed as thoroughly imaginative, as well as thoroughly responsible. But when she is
introduced to Mr. Longdon she encounters something outside her previous range of

83

experience and is more moved by this than she has ever been moved before. “You are
good,” she says to Mr. Longdon with tears in her eyes, “I see already how I shall feel it”
(154). Perhaps because it is new—perhaps because Mrs. Brooks for all her charm (she
was one of James’s favorite creations) has an air of sly corruption about her—Nanda
begins to see herself and everyone else in her mother’s world through Mr. Longdon’s
eyes. Mr. Longdon begins seeing them through Nanda’s eyes—or at least begins seeing
Nanda with greater clarity and appreciation—which eventually makes him realize that
Van may not have been the best person for her, though unfortunately this realization
comes too late to do any good. In the last few lines of the novel Nanda assures Mr.
Longdon that she would not have had Mitchy even if Van had married Little Aggie, and
we are left to wonder at the strength of her attachment to a man who has shown himself
to be something of a coward and a hypocrite. She has not misread him—she knows he
will not propose even as she marries Mitchy off in hopes that he will—and we can only
remark that love is a powerful thing and may not be amenable to reason even in those
who have made cultivating reason a habit. Then again it is also possible that she hopes
against hope that he will do for her what Mr. Longdon is left to do for her in the end and
what she had hoped little Aggie would do for Mitchy—“save him”—and we can interpret
this hope either as a weakness, as a hope that Van will save her from herself, or as a
strength, as a hope that Van will strengthen her sense of responsibility and help her see
more of the beauty and less of the suffering involved in such responsibility.
However we interpret Nanda’s preference for Van, enough of her actions are
unequivocally right (in the larger moral sense for which I am arguing) to serve as an
examples of the kind of behavior we might expect from a grown-up Maisie, one with a
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larger fund of knowledge and proportionately refined emotions. The last book of the The
Awkward Age, named after Nanda, shows her to have succeeded her mother in influence,
to have established her own lovely little rooms and to be holding successive
conversations with Van, Mitchy, and Mr. Longdon, not picking apart their characters
with artistic relish but divining what troubles each of them and doing the best she can to
make things better for each of them. She does this not just for them but for her mother as
well, summoning Van not to reproach him for abandoning her but to ask him to keep
coming to visit her mother, since her mother is obviously as much in love with Van as
she is. When Mr. Longdon comes in at the end Nanda even tries to reconcile him to Van,
though with such small success that she is compelled to criticize Mr. Longdon for being
“too proud about it”—“it” being, as they both know but do not say, Van’s refusal to
marry Nanda, even with Mr. Longdon’s inducements (536). Mr. Longdon is proud about
it, and their exchange on this point provides perhaps James’s clearest statement of what is
required of those determined to be thoroughly responsible perceivers (as well as why
most of James responsible perceivers are women!):
‘Well, what if I am [proud]?’ [Mr. Longdon] looked at her…‘Pride’s all
right when it helps one to bear things.’
‘Ah,’ said Nanda, ‘but that’s only when one wants to take the least from
them. When one wants to take the most—!’
‘Well?’—he spoke, as she faltered, with a certain small hardness of
interest.
She faltered, however, indeed. ‘Oh I don’t know how to say it.’ She
fairly coloured with the attempt. ‘One must let the sense of all that I
speak of—well, all come. One must rather like it. I don’t know—but
I suppose one must rather grovel.’
Mr. Longdon, though with a visible reluctance, turned it over. ‘That’s
very fine—but you’re a woman.’
‘Yes—that must make a difference. But being a woman, in such a case,
has then,’ Nanda went on, ‘its advantages.’
On this point perhaps her friend might presently have been taken as
relaxing. ‘It strikes me that even at that the advantages are mainly for
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others. I’m glad, God knows, that you’re not also a young man.’
‘Then we’re suited all round.’ (536-7)
Nanda may be too young to articulate all that she means here but Longdon evidently feels
it enough to think better of his pride in the lines immediately following this exchange.
Still, the reader is left feeling that even Mr. Longdon is incapable of rising to Nanda’s
level. He is, after all, a man, though not feeling as proud about it by the time the
exchange is over. Nanda might not intend the irony inherent in “being a woman has its
advantages,” but both Mr. Longdon and the reader feel it, the modern reader perhaps
even more than an old Victorian like Mr. Longdon. What he may be beginning to feel,
and what we have been impressed by as we have been listening to Nanda in her
conversations with Van and Mitchy, is that this “groveling” that Nanda has been doing
takes a lot more strength—a lot more “greatness” and genuine dignity—than the pride
Mr. Longdon exhibits. Her “pride” is not a matter of making her claims felt but of not
making them felt—of not allowing her own claims to get in the way of her attention to
others’. This does not mean that she is sublimating her own needs—indeed, she has been
facing them with as much honesty as she has faced everything else—but as this speech
(and many others) attests, she understands who she is and what she is about well enough
to be able to distinguish between her needs and emotions and those of others.
This speech also attests as clearly as anything else in James to the high level of
commitment necessary for “taking the most” from things. The difference between Nanda
and her mother is primarily a difference in their approaches to life: Nanda believes that
taking the most from things is a serious moral duty, Mrs. Brook that it is a diversion, like
going to the theater. If we as readers were to decide between the two primarily on the
basis of their consequences our decision may be difficult: Mrs. Brook has obviously
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been routed by the end of the novel, mostly because the premise that life is spectacle is
one that neither she nor her cohorts (primarily Van and Mitchy) can sustain, all of them
finding themselves compelled to take themselves and especially their feelings for other
people seriously before the novel is over. But discovering this flaw in her viewpoint does
not completely break her (and one wonders whether she fully understands it at all), and
by the novel’s end she has recovered enough to take an interest in the coming out of
Little Aggie. There will always be devotees to worship at her shrine, Mitchy assures her
daughter at the end of the novel: Mrs. Brook will “last” much longer than either he or
Nanda—there will always be those who come to Mrs. Brook for “‘help’” and
“‘understanding’” (Mitchy puts these words in quotes) (523). The understanding Mrs.
Brook offers is of limited value, consisting mainly in shaping all sorts of messy behavior
into bright clever costumes and handing them back to their relieved owners, but it is, as
Mitchy remarks, a service that most human beings stand perpetually in need of (523).
Nanda’s understanding, on the other hand, is less in demand, being much less dazzling
and much more inclined towards taking people more seriously than they may think they
need to be taken. For those who have discovered that they need to take themselves
seriously she is much more of a help than her mother could ever be; but unfortunately
there are very few serious people about in the awkward age. Even these are less of a help
to her than she is to them, and by the end of the novel she has been more or less forced to
retreat before their lack of appreciation. Still, the novel obviously intends for us to see
Nanda as an improvement on her mother and grandmother; from Lady Julia who
represents innocence there a natural progression into experience and then fall and decay
(the magnificent debacle at Tishy Grendon’s) and the emergence in the end of a newer
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higher order that takes the best of both and transforms them into something altogether
new. This newer higher order (which must ascend into the “Temple of Peace” to await
the end of the Awkward Age—unfortunately still going on a hundred years later!) is
higher than Mrs. Brooks’ because, again, it does justice the responsibility inherent in
perception. Those who embrace this order recognize that perception in an other-directed
act that begins in childhood when we first learn to differentiate between ourselves (the
“I”) and our environment. In those who become responsible perceivers this action is
constantly repeated as they grow older, so that both self and other (which includes people
and things and all their interactions) grow more and more clear and subtle and distinct.
Otherwise they do what the majority of James’s characters do, lose world in self and
become a bloated burping ego (Nanda’s brother Harold) or lose self in world and become
a shivering shade (poor Van).
This account of self-consciousness and its role in distinguishing between self and
others should be familiar to everyone schooled in the continental tradition of philosophy
and psychoanalysis. Recognizing the difference between self and other is foundational to
ethics—we cannot begin to ask ourselves, “What does he or she need?” until we know
who “he or she” is. But we also have to remember that self and other are interdependent:
not only do we define ourselves through contrast with others, we depend on them in a
more basic way—for sheer survival. Except for the hermit living on the mountain
(though even he was born and reared by someone), most of us rely on others on a daily
basis, whether we acknowledge it or not. Likewise our ability to perceive is dependent
on the existence of things to be perceived. Therefore, to recognize someone else’s needs
without acknowledging the obligation the recognition implies is dishonest. The
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recognition itself is proof of others’ importance. “We’re all in this together,” as a movie
star once said after rescuing one of his fans from being trampled by the crowd. Part of
Mrs. Brook’s problem is that she doesn’t acknowledge that “we’re all in this together”;
she does not completely follow through on the responsibility her recognition implies.
Nanda does, and I want to close this section by asking how love is related to her
knowledge and its attendant responsibilities. She has been in love with Van since she
was a child, choosing, as Maisie chooses, the most superior man of her acquaintance.
She goes even further than Maisie by actually sacrificing (instead of just being willing to
sacrifice) several of her friends for Van’s sake. Whether her love has blinded her to
Van’s weakness is difficult to say. She claims to be marrying Mitchy off for his own
good, but whether this is true or she actually doing it, as Mitchy thinks, to clear the field
for Van, the scheme backfires in both directions: Mitchy’s marriage does not make him
good and she herself does not get Van. Even if she were acting with a clear head and
pure intentions, the decision does not have happy consequences, and she is left at the end
of the novel almost as bereft as Maisie. Unlike Maisie however Nanda’s long practice in
“taking the most from things” enables her to see beyond whatever selfishness might have
remained in her love for Van and not only do what is best for him—covering his
weakness and encouraging his good—but also love those who have prevented her having
him, seeing their weaknesses and continuing to promote their happiness. Her last acts
before leaving with Mr. Longdon are to attempt to secure Van for her mother, to pledge
to stand by Mitchy, taking responsibility for the mess she has caused him, and to try to
defend Van to Mr. Longdon. We should note here that loving Van does not include
forcing him to become a responsible perceiver. As I mentioned in my discussion of The
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Spoils of Poynton, loving others may include encouraging them to develop higher levels
of awareness, especially when their lack of it jeopardizes their relationships with other
people. But loving others may also include refraining from pressuring them to achieve a
level of awareness they are obviously unable to achieve. One of the hallmarks of a
responsible perceiver is her ability to recognize that the good is not always the same for
every person—that a moral victory for one person may be a moral failure in another.
Once Nanda’s love for Van has been chastened by a more thorough awareness of his
character she is able to love him by demanding less of him—by not casting his failures up
to him, as he is obviously afraid she will, by doing exactly what will put him most at
ease, and by encouraging him in the good she knows he is capable of.
Endnotes
1

Henry James, The Awkward Age (New York: Charles Scribner’s sons, 1908): 23.
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Chapter VI
The kind of responsible reflection Fleda, Maisie, and Nanda possess in various
degrees obviously enables all three of them to love both friends and lovers more deeply
than they would have otherwise, if we compare their love to what passes for love in the
characters who are not responsible perceivers. Since all three of them are perceptive
characters to begin with we cannot say with as much certainty that loves furthers their
capacity for perception; but I think this connection is most clear in Maisie whose
understanding can be said to develop out of her need for love. Like any child drawn to
the kindest and most charming adult she knows, especially when the others are neither
kind nor charming, she is drawn to Sir Claude by instinct. She senses his superiority to
the others but has yet to develop the capacity to discriminate between his character and
her own needs. When circumstances finally forced her to define her position—to answer
in effect the question “What do you know?”—her answer is, “I know I love Sir Claude.”
This knowledge becomes the basis of her growing comprehension of Sir Claude’s
character in their last hours together at Boulogne. As I mentioned earlier, this
phenomenon should ring true to any of us who has known someone whose awareness of
self and others dramatically increased when he or she fell in love. Sometimes this
awareness extends to people other that oneself and the loved one and sometimes it does
not. When it does not, love can be said to cloud reflection. Maisie’s disdain for Mrs.
Beale and Mrs. Wix and Nanda’s insensitivity to Mitchy in asking him to marry a woman
he does not love are examples of this. Here again is where it becomes important for
characters to remind themselves that reflection is something that can never be
sacrificed—that all perspectives must be given equal due. This does not mean that
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everyone must be loved equally but that love should never interfere with clearsightedness. And as we have seen, cultivating clear-sightedness can often lead an
individual to love or appreciate people who might have seemed unlovable. The most
compelling thing about each of these characters (Nanda of course most successfully) is
the level of understanding they have for people whom others dismiss as useless or
immoral and how much this understanding resembles what we usually associate with
compassion, or neighborly or benevolent love. I do not want to suggest that benevolent
love is reducible to responsible perception, because despite the efforts of cognitive
theorists of emotion I think we all associate love with some kind of indefinable feeling,
and conceivably a person could be thoroughly reflective in a thoroughly responsible way
without exhibiting the kind of warmth we associate with love. What I do want to suggest
is that love depends on some basic level of awareness, some ability to differentiate
between self and other, and that the greater this awareness is the more authentic love will
be.
One thing the discussion of these three texts should have impressed on us is the
importance of personal integrity in James’s moral system. Since rules and precepts are
always conditional it is important for individuals to be able to see the conditions clearly,
“really to see…in face of the constant force that makes for muddlement” as James says in
the preface to What Maisie Knew.1 (And vision is made more difficult by the fact that
“the muddled state too is one of the very sharpest of realities.”) Morality is not about
conforming to rules but about cultivating the capacity to recognize whether or not the
rules apply or how they are best adapted to a particular situation, and love often plays a
role in developing this capacity. More often in James we see proof that “the
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nonjudgmental love of particulars characteristic of the best and most humane ethical
stance contains within itself a susceptibility to love,” but he also shows us that love
contains within itself a susceptibility to knowledge. Real love is not blind, at least not to
the qualities of the person loved. It may be blind to the qualities of everyone else, but at
that point responsible perception must reassert itself. Our largest responsibility is to life,
and to love one person exclusively and obsessively as Maggie chooses to do ultimately
deprives us of the growth in experience that is the means to maturity, to our full
flowering into all that we are capable of becoming as individual human beings.
Endnotes
1

James, What Maisie Knew, In the Cage, The Pupil (New York: Charles Scribner’s sons,
1908): xiii.
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